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safedep
vet
Go2023–2025
safedep / vet

vet

Protect against malicious open source packages 🤖

3Distinct people
16Mentions
0Explicit recommenders
1.1KGitHub stars
REPOSITORY AT A GLANCE

What to know before exploring

What it is

Protect against malicious open source packages 🤖

GitHub

Where it is used

No documented product use has been verified yet.

What people are saying

No recommendation phrase was found in the indexed comments.

No classified warning is attached to this page. Read the discussions before treating silence as approval.

Also in these discussions

No other repository is repeatedly linked in the same discussions.

This week on Hacker News

Nov 9–Nov 16 UTC · Direct repository links and separately labeled related project stories. Indexed through 11/16/2026, 4:35:25 PM UTC.

No direct repository links were found in the indexed HN discussions over the past seven days. Older discussions are available below.

Mentions over time

HN mentions by month16 dated mentions

Observed mentions: 2023-11-12 13:03:00 UTC to 2025-11-10 03:05:46 UTC.

01232023-11-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2023-12-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 1 submissions, 0 commentsNov 20232023-12-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 1 submissions, 0 comments2024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2024-02-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2024-02-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2024-03-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2024-03-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2024-04-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2024-04-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2024-05-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2024-05-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2024-06-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2024-06-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2024-07-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2024-07-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2024-08-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2024-08-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2024-09-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2024-09-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2024-10-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2024-10-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2024-11-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 1 submissions, 0 comments2024-11-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2024-12-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 commentsNov 20242024-12-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2025-02-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 1 submissions, 0 comments2025-02-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2025-03-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 1 submissions, 0 comments2025-03-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2025-04-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 2 mentions; 1 submissions, 1 comments2025-04-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2025-05-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 0 submissions, 1 comments2025-05-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2025-06-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 0 submissions, 1 comments2025-06-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2025-07-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 2 mentions; 1 submissions, 1 comments2025-07-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2025-08-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2025-08-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2025-09-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 0 submissions, 1 comments2025-09-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2025-10-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 3 mentions; 1 submissions, 2 comments2025-10-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2025-11-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2025-11-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2025-12-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 0 submissions, 1 commentsNov 2025

Counts come from the repository’s dated source evidence. Index cutoff: 2026-11-02 08:16:59 UTC.

View mention counts and date ranges
UTC ranges include their start and exclude their end. Select a period to filter the source evidence.
PeriodStart (UTC)End (exclusive, UTC)MentionsSubmissionsComments
Nov 20232023-11-01 00:00:00 UTC2023-12-01 00:00:00 UTC110
Dec 20232023-12-01 00:00:00 UTC2024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC110
Jan 20242024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2024-02-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Feb 20242024-02-01 00:00:00 UTC2024-03-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Mar 20242024-03-01 00:00:00 UTC2024-04-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Apr 20242024-04-01 00:00:00 UTC2024-05-01 00:00:00 UTC000
May 20242024-05-01 00:00:00 UTC2024-06-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Jun 20242024-06-01 00:00:00 UTC2024-07-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Jul 20242024-07-01 00:00:00 UTC2024-08-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Aug 20242024-08-01 00:00:00 UTC2024-09-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Sep 20242024-09-01 00:00:00 UTC2024-10-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Oct 20242024-10-01 00:00:00 UTC2024-11-01 00:00:00 UTC110
Nov 20242024-11-01 00:00:00 UTC2024-12-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Dec 20242024-12-01 00:00:00 UTC2025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Jan 20252025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2025-02-01 00:00:00 UTC110
Feb 20252025-02-01 00:00:00 UTC2025-03-01 00:00:00 UTC110
Mar 20252025-03-01 00:00:00 UTC2025-04-01 00:00:00 UTC211
Apr 20252025-04-01 00:00:00 UTC2025-05-01 00:00:00 UTC101
May 20252025-05-01 00:00:00 UTC2025-06-01 00:00:00 UTC101
Jun 20252025-06-01 00:00:00 UTC2025-07-01 00:00:00 UTC211
Jul 20252025-07-01 00:00:00 UTC2025-08-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Aug 20252025-08-01 00:00:00 UTC2025-09-01 00:00:00 UTC101
Sep 20252025-09-01 00:00:00 UTC2025-10-01 00:00:00 UTC312
Oct 20252025-10-01 00:00:00 UTC2025-11-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Nov 20252025-11-01 00:00:00 UTC2025-12-01 00:00:00 UTC101

What Hacker News says

2 sources
abhisek·Mar 20, 2025Submission

Show HN: Scan GitHub Actions for Malicious Code

Hello HN! Creator and maintainer of vet here. We have been working on malicious OSS code identification through static code analysis for a while. After the recent tj-actions/changed-files hack, we wanted the ability scan GitHub Action code as well since most of them are Javascript anyway. One of the challenges with scanning GHA compared to other package registries such as pypi, npm is immutability. While npm, pypi etc. guarantees immutability for a published version of artifact, GHA tags are mutable. This means we cannot trust the results of a tag (e.g. v1) scanned in the past. To workaround this problem for GitHub Actions scanning, we choose to always resolve a given tag/branch to a commit SHA before actually performing code analysis.
1 points · Open discussion
I think the conventional approach of checking for vulnerabilities in 3rd party dependencies by querying CVE or some other database has set the current behaviour i.e. if its not vulnerable it must be safe. This implicit trust on vulnerability databases has been exploited in the wild to push malicious code to downstream users. I think we will see security tools shifting towards "code" as the source of truth when making safety and security decision about 3rd party packages instead of relying only on known vulnerability databases. Take a look at vet, we are working on active code analysis of OSS packages (+ transitive dependencies) to look for malicious code: https://github.com/safedep/vet
In Tj-actions/changed-files GitHub Action Compromised – used by over 23K repos

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