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salesforce
ja3
Python2017–2023
salesforce / ja3 · Archived

ja3

JA3 is a standard for creating SSL client fingerprints in an easy to produce and shareable way.

15Distinct people
15Mentions
0Explicit recommenders
3.1KGitHub stars
REPOSITORY AT A GLANCE

What to know before exploring

What it is

JA3 is a standard for creating SSL client fingerprints in an easy to produce and shareable way.

GitHub

Where it is used

No documented product use was verified in the last source check.

What people are saying

No recommendation phrase was found in the indexed comments.

No classified warning is attached to this page. Read the discussions before treating silence as approval.

Also in these discussions

No other repository is repeatedly linked in the same discussions.

This week on Hacker News

Nov 9–Nov 16 UTC · Direct repository links and separately labeled related project stories. Indexed through 11/16/2026, 12:01:57 AM UTC.

No direct repository links were found in the indexed HN discussions over the past seven days. Older discussions are available below.

Mentions over time

HN mentions by year15 dated mentions

Observed mentions: 2017-07-26 14:59:55 UTC to 2023-06-30 13:08:42 UTC.

012342017-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2018-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 1 submissions, 0 comments20172018-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 3 mentions; 2 submissions, 1 comments2019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 0 submissions, 1 comments2020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments20202021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 3 mentions; 0 submissions, 3 comments2022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 4 mentions; 3 submissions, 1 comments2023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 3 mentions; 0 submissions, 3 comments2023

Counts come from the repository’s dated source evidence. Index cutoff: 2026-11-02 08:16:59 UTC.

View mention counts and date ranges
UTC ranges include their start and exclude their end. Select a period to filter the source evidence.
PeriodStart (UTC)End (exclusive, UTC)MentionsSubmissionsComments
20172017-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2018-01-01 00:00:00 UTC110
20182018-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC321
20192019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC101
20202020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC000
20212021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC303
20222022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC431
20232023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC303

What Hacker News says

3 sources
This paper is nice, but it goes over some finer technical things. So, not about the great wall, but there's projects out there, like this one https://github.com/salesforce/ja3 , which talk about how you can fingerprint fully encrypted traffic(TLS/HTPS). There's a great section in the Readme "How it works" that goes over it. Would be surprising if the great wall doesn't do this, when some open source firewall will.
In How the great firewall of China detects and blocks fully encrypted traffic [pdf]
From the circleCI blogpost[1]: "Our investigation indicates that the malware was able to execute session cookie theft, enabling them to impersonate the targeted employee in a remote location" I haven't seen much discussion on how this specific attacker entrypoint can be mitigated. So I'm going to make a naive attempt in this comment. How about storing the client's IP address in the session cookie. Then whenever the server recieves the cookie, it compares the client's IP address against the one stored in the session cookie. The server denies the login if there's a mismatch. The cookie would of-course have to be signed(hmac etc) so that it is tamper proof. One problem with this is that client IP addresses are easily spoofed[2]. So, instead of storing the client's IP address; how about we instead store the clients' SSL fingerprints[3][4]. I
Read the rest
In CircleCI says hackers stole encryption keys and customers’ source code
They may be referring to JA3 [0] which can be used to fingerprint the connection by examining the order of the ciphers sent by client to server during the TLS handshake. It isn't useful to detect that the user is browsing on an iphone, but rather that the useragent says the user is using an iphone but the JA3 gives it away as something else. It can be defeated by the client sending a specific list of ciphers in a specific order during the TLS handshake but in practice this can be difficult to do as it's typically implemented at a low level. Alternatively, creating a browser extension can also be used to defeat it as the request is running through the browser's code in that case. [0] https://github.com/salesforce/ja3
In Devirtualizing nike.com's bot protection

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