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samboy
MaraDNS
C2020–2026
samboy / MaraDNS

MaraDNS

MaraDNS: A small open-source DNS server

4Distinct people
18Mentions
0Explicit recommenders
573GitHub stars
REPOSITORY AT A GLANCE

What to know before exploring

What it is

MaraDNS: A small open-source DNS server

GitHub

Where it is used

No documented product use has been verified yet.

What people are saying

No recommendation phrase was found in the indexed comments.

No classified warning is attached to this page. Read the discussions before treating silence as approval.

Also in these discussions

No other repository is repeatedly linked in the same discussions.

This week on Hacker News

Nov 9–Nov 16 UTC · Direct repository links and separately labeled related project stories. Indexed through 11/16/2026, 7:27:27 AM UTC.

No direct repository links were found in the indexed HN discussions over the past seven days. Older discussions are available below.

Mentions over time

HN mentions by year18 dated mentions

Observed mentions: 2020-05-04 22:21:40 UTC to 2026-09-25 18:51:40 UTC.

02462020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 2 mentions; 0 submissions, 2 comments20202021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 6 mentions; 0 submissions, 6 comments2022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 0 submissions, 1 comments2023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 2 mentions; 1 submissions, 1 comments20232024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 0 submissions, 1 comments2025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2026-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2027-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 6 mentions; 0 submissions, 6 comments. Incomplete calendar period.2026*

* An incomplete calendar period is marked with an outlined bar. Its count is not directly comparable with a full period.

Counts come from the repository’s dated source evidence. Index cutoff: 2026-11-02 08:16:59 UTC.

View mention counts and date ranges
UTC ranges include their start and exclude their end. Select a period to filter the source evidence.
PeriodStart (UTC)End (exclusive, UTC)MentionsSubmissionsComments
20202020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC202
20212021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC606
20222022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC101
20232023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC211
20242024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC101
20252025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2026-01-01 00:00:00 UTC000
2026 (partial)2026-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2027-01-01 00:00:00 UTC606

What Hacker News says

6 sources
>>>when I tried it in the latest version of clang on godbolt, that it is eliminating the seeding of the entropy pool<<< This is an unverified claim. My own testing does not show TCC, GCC, nor clang “optimizing out” the code using uninitialized memory as an entropy pool. The full test is here: https://github.com/samboy/MaraDNS/tree/master/deadwood-githu... In summary: On Ubuntu, and in clang at higher levels of optimization, the uninitialized memory is made 0s, but the cryptographic pseudo random number generator still runs. Tests have been done against TCC, GCC, clang, as well as GCC and clang in Cygwin. As an aside, uninitialized memory does seem to give a little bit of entropy with GCC in cygwin, which indicates it probably did back in 2007 when I originally wrote that code (it doesn’t these days with clang with optimization, nor in U
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buntu, which is why I use clock_gettime() as a second possible source of entropy instead of uninitialized memory) I take claims of security holes in my software seriously, and this isn’t the first time someone made a claim of a real-world security problem, I tested the claim, and was unable to reproduce the alleged security hole in my code.
In AMD's random number generator can't generate a 0?
Black-and-white thinking like this is always inaccurate. >untested The automated tests includes tests that make sure the XOF is correctly implemented. [1] >unlooked at People have been looking at my code for security holes for well over 20 years, and I have been getting multiple AI assisted security reports over the last year, things like “there’s a buffer overflow in this code which is nay to impossible to exploit, using code which hasn’t even been able to compile since 2022”. [1] https://github.com/samboy/MaraDNS/tree/master/deadwood-githu... and https://github.com/samboy/MaraDNS/tree/master/deadwood-githu...
In AMD's random number generator can't generate a 0?
Apologies for being confrontational; accusations of there being security holes are serious accusations in my book, and need to be backed up with solid facts. Yes, that’s how seriously I take security with the software I make available on the Internet. That number is a 32-bit number in the C code, but it’s converted in to a 16-bit number. I used “int” to have it interface with other Lua code, but safely assume “int” can fit 16 bits, and yes I do convert the number to a 16-bit one before passing it off to other Lua code: https://github.com/samboy/LUAlibs/blob/master/rg32.c#L77 Here, I assume lua_number can pass 32 bits: https://github.com/samboy/LUAlibs/blob/master/rg32.c#L45 https://github.com/samboy/MaraDNS/blob/master/coLunacyDNS/lu... https://github.com/samboy/lunacy/blob/master/src/lmathlib.c#... But it works without issue: rg32.ran
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domseed("shakna3") print(string.format("%x",rg32.rand32())) One sees “b0e6725c”, i.e. a 32-bit unsigned number Likewise: rg32.randomseed("shakna3") print(string.format("%x %x",rg32.rand16(),rg32.rand16())) Gives us “b0e6 725c”. Vendoring Lua 5.1 was forced; since I wanted to use Lua 5.1 (for reasons described above, e.g. LuaJIT compatibility), I had to use code which hasn’t been updated upstream since 2012.
In CERT is releasing six CVEs for serious security vulnerabilities in dnsmasq
>>>The patch landing in 2021, instead of 2014, being one of those concerns.<<< What makes you think I was using Lua in 2014? Seriously, do you even know how to use “git log”? I added Lua to MaraDNS in 2020: https://github.com/samboy/MaraDNS/commit/2e154c163a465ee7ead... I patched it on my own in 2021: https://github.com/samboy/MaraDNS/commit/efddb3a92b9cee30f11... >>>you might want to recheck your assumption of how big 'int' will be uint32_t is always 32-bit: https://en.cppreference.com/c/types/integer And, yes, this can be easily checked with a tiny C program: #include <stdint.h> #include <stdio.h> int main() { uint32_t foo = 0xfffffffd; uint64_t bar = 0xfffffffd; uint32_t a = 0; for(a=0;a<20;a++) { printf("%16llx:%16llx\n",foo++,bar++); } return 0; } If there’s a system where uint32_t is 64 bits, that’s a
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bug with the compiler (which isn’t following the spec), not MaraDNS. Are you going to make any other negative false implications about MaraDNS? Because you’re making a lot of very negative accusations without bothering to check first. Edit: Here’s a version of the above C program which works in tcc 0.9.25: #include <stdint.h> #include <stdio.h> void shownum(uint64_t in) { int32_t a; for(a=60;a>=0;a-=4) { int n = (in >> a) & 0xf; if(n < 10) {printf("%c",'0'+n);} else {printf("%c",'a'+(n-10)); } } return; } int main() { uint32_t foo = 0xfffffffd; uint64_t bar = 0xfffffffd; uint32_t a = 0; for(a=0;a<20;a++) { shownum(foo++); printf(":"); shownum(bar++); puts(""); } return 0; }
In CERT is releasing six CVEs for serious security vulnerabilities in dnsmasq
Shameless plug time: My own MaraDNS has been extensively audited now that we’re in the age of AI-assisted security audits. Not one single serious security bug has been found since 2023. [1] The only bugs auditers have been finding are things like “Deadwood, when fully recursive, will take longer than usual to release resources when getting this unusual packet” [2] or “This side utility included with MaraDNS, which hasn’t been able to be compiled since 2022, has a buffer overflow, but only if one’s $HOME is over 50 characters in length” [3] I’m actually really pleased just how secure MaraDNS is now that it’s getting real in depth security audits. [1] https://samboy.github.io/MaraDNS/webpage/security.html [2] https://github.com/samboy/MaraDNS/discussions/136 [3] https://github.com/samboy/MaraDNS/pull/137
In CERT is releasing six CVEs for serious security vulnerabilities in dnsmasq

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