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satoshilabs
slips
Markdown2019–2023
satoshilabs / slips

slips

SatoshiLabs Improvement Proposals

4Distinct people
5Mentions
0Explicit recommenders
1.7KGitHub stars
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SatoshiLabs Improvement Proposals

GitHub

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What people are saying

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Also in these discussions

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This week on Hacker News

Nov 7–Nov 14 UTC · Direct repository links and separately labeled related project stories. Indexed through 11/14/2026, 3:56:07 PM UTC.

No direct repository links were found in the indexed HN discussions over the past seven days. Older discussions are available below.

Mentions over time

HN mentions by year5 dated mentions

Observed mentions: 2019-09-05 19:10:32 UTC to 2023-08-02 15:12:39 UTC.

0122019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 1 submissions, 0 comments20192020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments20212022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 2 mentions; 0 submissions, 2 comments2023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 2 mentions; 0 submissions, 2 comments2023

Counts come from the repository’s dated source evidence. Index cutoff: 2026-11-02 08:16:59 UTC.

View mention counts and date ranges
UTC ranges include their start and exclude their end. Select a period to filter the source evidence.
PeriodStart (UTC)End (exclusive, UTC)MentionsSubmissionsComments
20192019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC110
20202020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC000
20212021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC000
20222022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC202
20232023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC202

What Hacker News says

5 sources
For anybody new or returning to SSS, check out SLIP-0039: https://github.com/satoshilabs/slips/blob/master/slip-0039.m... One of the big downsides of SSS is that it’s very raw and you have to do a lot of legwork to make it actually useable. For instance, you can sss_combine any arbitrary polynomial coefficients and get a result, you don’t know if the reconstituted data is correct until you try to use it. Implementations can vary in the finite field chosen because SSS doesn't specify one, and not all are equal and they are not interchangeable (coefficients from one don’t work in another). Another issue is that it’s susceptible to collusion. It’s rightfully criticized for its shortcomings and the argument follows the don’t roll your own crypto vein. SSS is like handing a dev XOR and telling them “now go encrypt things”. SLIP39 solves this
Read the rest
by formalizing a protocol for handling SSS splits built atop standards for crypto key serialization (BIP-39). SLIP defines a standard finite field (used when interpreting the polynomial coefficients), SLIP shards are unique on each generation so parties with the same underlying SSS shard can’t compare mnemonics, they’re mnemonically serialized for humans, and they have a checksum and group index metadata which makes a more sane UX possible when combining. SLIP also describes a two layer setup so you can manage trust by cordoning people off into groups to help litigate collusion.
In Shamir Secret Sharing
"The Personal Infosec & Security Checklist" https://www.goldfiglabs.com/guide/personal-infosec-security-... Internet safety, DNS security, https://wrdrd.github.io/docs/consulting/kids #internet-safety #family-media-plan #screen-time-guidelines Rclone supports encryption over top of like every cloud storage provider; and then what js could hit delete and confirm on our cloud storage, resulting in starting over from zero, like preppers, like bushcrafters - with DR bushcraft knives with flints (and hand-crank solar rechargeable FM/WX radio USB powerpacks) - like a low-budget made for TV Swiss Family Robinson: https://wrdrd.github.io/docs/tools#rclone Ansible-molecule, DevSec baselines; your (1) Raspberry Pi SD card will fail, and probably before a thumbdrive or an SSD. E2E: Cyph, Keybase has encrypted git repos; GitLab/Gitea does Issues wit
Read the rest
h trackbacks: https://www.cyph.com/blog/cyph-pgp PWD generates a printable substitution box: https://github.com/westurner/pwd SGP: SuperGenPass https://github.com/chriszarate/supergenpass JS implementations of SSS to do better than splitting a string in parts and printing some redundantly: https://github.com/topics/shamir-secret-sharing "SLIP-0039: Shamir's Secret-Sharing for Mnemonic Codes" https://github.com/satoshilabs/slips/blob/master/slip-0039.m... : > Shamir's secret-sharing provides a better mechanism for backing up secrets by distributing custodianship among a number of trusted parties in a manner that can prevent loss even if one or a few of those parties become compromised. > However, the lack of SSS standardization to date presents a risk of being unable to perform secret recovery in the future should the tooling change. Therefore, we propose standardizing SSS so that SLIP-0039 compatible implementations will be interoperable.
In Ask HN: Do you manage your family's digital safety?
`ssh-keygen` #Certificates: https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man1/ssh-keygen.1.html#CERT... "DevSec SSH Baseline" ssh_spec.rb, sshd_spec.rb https://github.com/dev-sec/ssh-baseline/blob/master/controls... "SLIP-0039: Shamir's Secret-Sharing for Mnemonic Codes" https://github.com/satoshilabs/slips/blob/master/slip-0039.m... > Shamir's secret-sharing provides a better mechanism for backing up secrets by distributing custodianship among a number of trusted parties in a manner that can prevent loss even if one or a few of those parties become compromised. > However, the lack of SSS standardization to date presents a risk of being unable to perform secret recovery in the future should the tooling change. Therefore, we propose standardizing SSS so that SLIP-0039 compatible implementations will be interoperable.
In If you’re not using SSH certificates you’re doing SSH wrong (2019)

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