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signalapp
Signal-TLS-Proxy
Shell2021–2023
signalapp / Signal-TLS-Proxy

Signal-TLS-Proxy

Discover this repository through its Hacker News conversations.

21Distinct people
24Mentions
0Explicit recommenders
1.3KGitHub stars
REPOSITORY AT A GLANCE

What to know before exploring

What it is

A public description has not been verified.

Where it is used

No documented product use was verified in the last source check.

What people are saying

No recommendation phrase was found in the indexed comments.

No classified warning is attached to this page. Read the discussions before treating silence as approval.

Also in these discussions

No other repository is repeatedly linked in the same discussions.

This week on Hacker News

Nov 7–Nov 14 UTC · Direct repository links and separately labeled related project stories. Indexed through 11/14/2026, 5:04:57 PM UTC.

No direct repository links were found in the indexed HN discussions over the past seven days. Older discussions are available below.

Mentions over time

HN mentions by month24 dated mentions

Observed mentions: 2021-02-04 18:12:03 UTC to 2023-05-27 18:30:33 UTC.

0510152021-02-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2021-03-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 15 mentions; 0 submissions, 15 commentsFeb 20212021-03-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2021-04-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2021-04-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2021-05-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2021-05-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2021-06-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2021-06-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2021-07-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2021-07-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2021-08-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2021-08-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2021-09-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2021-09-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2021-10-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2021-10-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2021-11-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2021-11-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2021-12-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2021-12-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2022-02-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2022-02-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2022-03-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2022-03-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2022-04-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 1 submissions, 0 commentsMar 20222022-04-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2022-05-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2022-05-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2022-06-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2022-06-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2022-07-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2022-07-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2022-08-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2022-08-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2022-09-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2022-09-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2022-10-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 6 mentions; 1 submissions, 5 comments2022-10-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2022-11-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 0 submissions, 1 comments2022-11-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2022-12-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2022-12-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2023-02-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2023-02-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2023-03-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2023-03-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2023-04-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2023-04-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2023-05-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2023-05-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2023-06-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 0 submissions, 1 commentsMay 2023

Counts come from the repository’s dated source evidence. Index cutoff: 2026-11-02 08:16:59 UTC.

View mention counts and date ranges
UTC ranges include their start and exclude their end. Select a period to filter the source evidence.
PeriodStart (UTC)End (exclusive, UTC)MentionsSubmissionsComments
Feb 20212021-02-01 00:00:00 UTC2021-03-01 00:00:00 UTC15015
Mar 20212021-03-01 00:00:00 UTC2021-04-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Apr 20212021-04-01 00:00:00 UTC2021-05-01 00:00:00 UTC000
May 20212021-05-01 00:00:00 UTC2021-06-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Jun 20212021-06-01 00:00:00 UTC2021-07-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Jul 20212021-07-01 00:00:00 UTC2021-08-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Aug 20212021-08-01 00:00:00 UTC2021-09-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Sep 20212021-09-01 00:00:00 UTC2021-10-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Oct 20212021-10-01 00:00:00 UTC2021-11-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Nov 20212021-11-01 00:00:00 UTC2021-12-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Dec 20212021-12-01 00:00:00 UTC2022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Jan 20222022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2022-02-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Feb 20222022-02-01 00:00:00 UTC2022-03-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Mar 20222022-03-01 00:00:00 UTC2022-04-01 00:00:00 UTC110
Apr 20222022-04-01 00:00:00 UTC2022-05-01 00:00:00 UTC000
May 20222022-05-01 00:00:00 UTC2022-06-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Jun 20222022-06-01 00:00:00 UTC2022-07-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Jul 20222022-07-01 00:00:00 UTC2022-08-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Aug 20222022-08-01 00:00:00 UTC2022-09-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Sep 20222022-09-01 00:00:00 UTC2022-10-01 00:00:00 UTC615
Oct 20222022-10-01 00:00:00 UTC2022-11-01 00:00:00 UTC101
Nov 20222022-11-01 00:00:00 UTC2022-12-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Dec 20222022-12-01 00:00:00 UTC2023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Jan 20232023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2023-02-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Feb 20232023-02-01 00:00:00 UTC2023-03-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Mar 20232023-03-01 00:00:00 UTC2023-04-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Apr 20232023-04-01 00:00:00 UTC2023-05-01 00:00:00 UTC000
May 20232023-05-01 00:00:00 UTC2023-06-01 00:00:00 UTC101

From the project README

An excerpt from the repository, fetched Nov 13, 2026.

Read the project’s introduction
Signal TLS Proxy To run a Signal TLS proxy, you will need a host that has ports 80 and 443 available and a domain name that points to that host. Install Docker by following the instructions at https://docs.docker.com/engine/install/ Clone this repository ./init-certificate.sh docker compose up --detach Your proxy is now running! You can share this with the URL https://signal.tube/#<your_host_name> Updating from a previous version If you've previously run a proxy, please update to the most recent version by pulling the most recent changes from main, then restarting your Docker containers: git pull docker compose down docker compose build docker compose up --detach Stability Policy We endeavor to provide updates to this repository thirty days in advance of them being required to use the Signal service, but may not always be able to do so for operational reasons. Proxy operators are advised to please check for updates at least once every thirty days, if not more often. You may use the instructions above to update as needed. Contributions welcome We want this proxy to be simple to deploy for a broad population, but we know that it won’t fit all deployments—especially advanced users that already have running servers or specific technology preferences. We welcome contributions that make incremental improvements, updates, and improve compatibility, but aren’t considering significant architectural changes.
Read the full README on GitHub

What Hacker News says

24 sources
A significant amount of people will go "huh, Signal will only work when my Netflix VPN is on, I wonder why that is". Signal won't just disappear. In fact, Signal has a network of volunteers running special proxy services[1] to access Signal from countries with oppressive governments. Signal the company may leave, but Signal the app will try to stay relevant for as long as possible. [1]: https://github.com/signalapp/Signal-TLS-Proxy
In KryptEY – Android keyboard for E2EE comms via Signal protocol in any messenger
3np·Mar 1, 2022Submission

Ask HN: VPS Providers in Russia

As internet access is getting further restricted in Russia, I think there are those among us who would be happy to try doing their part by helping people in Russia communicating both internally and externally while staying, evade censorship and maintaining privacy. Examples: https://github.com/signalapp/Signal-TLS-Proxy (is there something similar for TG?) https://snowflake.torproject.org/ What are some places where one can acquire IP and/or compute in Russia? People in Russia: Apart from Tor and Signal, what else do you feel needs to be bridged?
6 points · Open discussion
> Having made rules is not sufficient for those rules to be just Quite. And if one doesn't think the rules are just, then simply don't play the game. However, rules such as "don't spam an issue", "don't spam a PR", "don't insult others", "please use the forum for this discussion" strike me as being simple, sensible and just rules. Which rules are unjust, in this context? > Rules are not themselves authority bearing - nor can one side be upset when they make obnoxious rules and get push back. In a dictatorship - such as a web site forum - the rules are, in fact, authority bearing. Since a user or their content can be removed at the whim of an operator, that authority is proven. This entire dramatic performance has been because the entirety of one "side" is upset when they've been subjected to pushback because they have broken the rules, an
Read the rest
d the authority of those rules has been effected. > When you respond to criticism of those rules by deleting the criticisms... well it's clear you are no longer hosting an open forum and instead trying to shut down speech you don't like. You are conflating what happened here. A user committed malconduct (of the sort that most projects would react badly to) and their offending material was deleted because it was an unhelpful duplicate placed in the wrong forum. Such content can only be deleted because it is...unhelpful, duplicate and in the wrong forum. All that was needed was the discussion moved to where it was expected. GitHub projects are not open forums and the PR was not speech. > The posters did not use insults, they did not attack the people behind signal I refute this statement with the following: https://github.com/signalapp/Signal-TLS-Proxy/pull/15#issuec... https://github.com/signalapp/Signal-TLS-Proxy/pull/15#issuec... https://github.com/signalapp/Signal-TLS-Proxy/pull/15#issuec... https://github.com/signalapp/Signal-TLS-Proxy/pull/15#issuec... https://community.signalusers.org/t/why-signal-blocked-me-fr... (more a threat than insult, I guess) https://community.signalusers.org/t/why-signal-blocked-me-fr... https://community.signalusers.org/t/why-signal-blocked-me-fr... > Shutting down a potentially serious security bug They were not shut down to begin with - they were simply asked to post in the correct forum. Once they started their abusive behaviour they had to be shut down because they couldn't behave themselves. > This isn't a child's baseball game, this is a situation where lives are at risk. "Sorry, we really tried to put out the fire, but your yard sign made me upset and I had to go write in my journal instead of doing my job." I'm not sure what you're trying to achieve here, other than proving one of my latter points.
In A Statement on Recent Events Between Signal and the Anti-Censorship Community
You don't see why making such a pull request would be inappropriate? Do you understand what pull requests are for? Does this look like an attempt at productive contribution to you? https://github.com/signalapp/Signal-TLS-Proxy/pull/15 Is this a good patch? It just drops a random file into the repo. https://github.com/signalapp/Signal-TLS-Proxy/commit/40f4d9d... These people decided to abuse the pull request system after being asked to use https://community.signalusers.org/ instead of GH issues to discuss their concerns.
In A Statement on Recent Events Between Signal and the Anti-Censorship Community
Sorry, where's the vulnerability in _signal_ here? The TLS proxy is not sufficient. Marlinspike addressed this in their incredibly childish PR [0]: >As we said in the blog post, it is nothing more than a simple TLS proxy as an interim solution to help people while we're working on something more scalable and more robust I'm not so sure they made it clear they were working on another solution in that blog post [1], but it's a known problem that proxies can be fingered. I don't see the value add here and I can't read this as anything other than "boo hoo, we weren't listened to" (which is not surprising, given their behavior) [0]: https://github.com/signalapp/Signal-TLS-Proxy/pull/15#issuec... [1]: https://signal.org/blog/help-iran-reconnect/
In A Statement on Recent Events Between Signal and the Anti-Censorship Community
> You were blocked because you know that we don't use GH for discussion, but came here anyway and started opening fake PRs so that you could post and harass other people on GH. > …If you want to discuss anything about circumvention or any other aspects of Signal in a way that is respectful to the rest of the community, please join in on the forums. https://github.com/signalapp/Signal-TLS-Proxy/pull/15#issuec... That does not to me seem like "shutting down the conversation completely". (As if there is even a way to do that on the internet if you were to try!)
In A Statement on Recent Events Between Signal and the Anti-Censorship Community
The answer from Moxie to these people: https://github.com/signalapp/Signal-TLS-Proxy/pull/15#issuec... I think that says it all. I'm also a bit concerned that "security researchers" don't seem to understand the threat model. Signal has never claimed to be able to hide that it was being used. The TLS proxy is only meant to help circumvent censorship, not obfuscate its protocol. And indeed, as a temporary solution, it's not ideal even to circumvent censorship. But they're apparently working on something better, and all this distraction is not helping.
In A Statement on Recent Events Between Signal and the Anti-Censorship Community
In case anybody still wonders, I guess realducksoft (the poster of this thread) is the DuckSoft on GitHub, who discovered this problem with help from another GitHub user studentmain. They are both developers from China, which is why their English isn't very good (My English is bad too, sorry). However, based on my observation, they've spend years on the related field (Let's just call it "Secured Data Transmission"), that makes them the pros here. So personally, I trust their discovery and believe what they have found is indeed a critical security vulnerability that could threatens people's safety, especially when the service/program was designed to put a middle finger in their government's face. I hope Signal can make something better than this (, and it seems they are trying [0]). [0] https://github.com/signalapp/Signal-TLS-Proxy/pull/15
Read the rest
#issuec... Off topic: There are only 2 useful posts in the issue #15, one was the #issue-568737654 and another was #issuecomment-774982590, the others were mostly spams. I don't think it helped the situation isn't it? Oh, by the way, I encountered studentmain once. He was the one who "recovered" the few comments that I replied to an issue under Shadowsocks's GitHub repository from the his email record. The word "recovered" is because I intentionally deleted those comments to protect myself from been exposed too much, and he just pasted everything back on including my name and ask me "why so careful". So he cares about the Privacy of the others now? Well, kudos to him ;)
In Signal ignores proxy censorship vulnerability, bans researchers

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