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sipa
bitcoin
TypeScript2013–2023
sipa / bitcoin

bitcoin

Bitcoin integration/staging tree

Finance & Commerce
Explore on GitHubRead Hacker News discussions
3Distinct people
5Mentions
0Explicit recommenders
95GitHub stars
REPOSITORY AT A GLANCE

What to know before exploring

What it is

Bitcoin integration/staging tree

GitHub

Where it is used

No documented product use has been verified yet.

What people are saying

No recommendation phrase was found in the indexed comments.

No classified warning is attached to this page. Read the discussions before treating silence as approval.

Also in these discussions

  • xiph/opus · linked in 2 of the same discussions

Mentioned in the same Hacker News threads. That is not proof they are substitutes.

This week on Hacker News

Nov 8–Nov 15 UTC · Direct repository links and separately labeled related project stories. Indexed through 11/15/2026, 9:02:44 AM UTC.

No direct repository links were found in the indexed HN discussions over the past seven days. Older discussions are available below.

Mentions over time

HN mentions by year5 dated mentions

Observed mentions: 2013-11-25 05:46:31 UTC to 2023-08-25 07:15:12 UTC.

0122013-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2014-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 0 submissions, 1 comments20132014-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2015-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 2 mentions; 0 submissions, 2 comments2015-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2016-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2016-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2017-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2017-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2018-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2018-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments20182019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 0 submissions, 1 comments2023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 0 submissions, 1 comments2023

Counts come from the repository’s dated source evidence. Index cutoff: 2026-11-02 08:16:59 UTC.

View mention counts and date ranges
UTC ranges include their start and exclude their end. Select a period to filter the source evidence.
PeriodStart (UTC)End (exclusive, UTC)MentionsSubmissionsComments
20132013-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2014-01-01 00:00:00 UTC101
20142014-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2015-01-01 00:00:00 UTC202
20152015-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2016-01-01 00:00:00 UTC000
20162016-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2017-01-01 00:00:00 UTC000
20172017-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2018-01-01 00:00:00 UTC000
20182018-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC000
20192019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC000
20202020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC000
20212021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC000
20222022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC101
20232023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC101

What Hacker News says

2 sources
scintill76·Feb 12, 2014
I don't think it should be called a bug. Peter Todd (well-known Bitcoin developer), said[1]: > [...]I'm a bit hesitant to bake in assumptions about malleability when we have no solid idea if ECC signatures are or are not malleable on a fundemental level; if "whack-a-mole" anti-malleability is all we've got it could be ugly if a break is found. I understand this to mean, there may be unknown ways to transform signatures, like the s sign flip you quoted. In that case there would be no way to know which representation is "canonical." Thus, malleability is either a fundamental, fatal flaw in Bitcoin, or just something Bitcoin developers need to work around. Now, it seems even the reference implementation isn't perfect about malleability, and perhaps people could have been better about making the issue known. So there is work to be done, b
Read the rest
ut it is not a "bug" that can be "fixed", at least not without upgrading the entire network, and/or risking it popping up in the future when someone applies more ECDSA signature mutation tricks. The real solution, if you want to safely fingerprint transactions, is to make your own transaction hash that is immune to malleability, like [2]. [1] http://sourceforge.net/mailarchive/message.php?msg_id=319546... [2] https://github.com/sipa/bitcoin/commit/e7853a91cf646a6a47011...
In Bitcoin Exchanges Under ‘Massive and Concerted Attack’
nullc·Feb 10, 2014
These are not all that directly related— they're the start of a set of changes which will probably take us one to three years to fully deploy... what mtgox was talking about in their press releases was just some simple standard way of generating a stable ID, this wouldn't be a protocol change at all... and is only a few lines of code: https://github.com/sipa/bitcoin/commits/normtxid But whats more important is that this malleability stuff is not very much related to fraud risk, I explained more here: http://sourceforge.net/mailarchive/message.php?msg_id=319565...
In Why Mt. Gox is full of shit

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