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smx-smx
xzre
C2024–2024
smx-smx / xzre

xzre

XZ backdoor reverse engineering

2Distinct people
2Mentions
0Explicit recommenders
108GitHub stars
REPOSITORY AT A GLANCE

What to know before exploring

What it is

XZ backdoor reverse engineering

GitHub

Where it is used

No documented product use has been verified yet.

What people are saying

No recommendation phrase was found in the indexed comments.

No classified warning is attached to this page. Read the discussions before treating silence as approval.

Also in these discussions

No other repository is repeatedly linked in the same discussions.

This week on Hacker News

Nov 7–Nov 14 UTC · Direct repository links and separately labeled related project stories. Indexed through 11/14/2026, 5:04:57 PM UTC.

No direct repository links were found in the indexed HN discussions over the past seven days. Older discussions are available below.

Mentions over time

HN mentions by day2 dated mentions

Observed mentions: 2024-04-07 17:18:46 UTC to 2024-04-30 13:47:59 UTC.

012024-04-07 00:00:00 UTC to 2024-04-08 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 0 submissions, 1 commentsApr 72024-04-08 00:00:00 UTC to 2024-04-09 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2024-04-09 00:00:00 UTC to 2024-04-10 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2024-04-10 00:00:00 UTC to 2024-04-11 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2024-04-11 00:00:00 UTC to 2024-04-12 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2024-04-12 00:00:00 UTC to 2024-04-13 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2024-04-13 00:00:00 UTC to 2024-04-14 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2024-04-14 00:00:00 UTC to 2024-04-15 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2024-04-15 00:00:00 UTC to 2024-04-16 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2024-04-16 00:00:00 UTC to 2024-04-17 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2024-04-17 00:00:00 UTC to 2024-04-18 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2024-04-18 00:00:00 UTC to 2024-04-19 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 commentsApr 182024-04-19 00:00:00 UTC to 2024-04-20 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2024-04-20 00:00:00 UTC to 2024-04-21 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2024-04-21 00:00:00 UTC to 2024-04-22 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2024-04-22 00:00:00 UTC to 2024-04-23 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2024-04-23 00:00:00 UTC to 2024-04-24 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2024-04-24 00:00:00 UTC to 2024-04-25 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2024-04-25 00:00:00 UTC to 2024-04-26 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2024-04-26 00:00:00 UTC to 2024-04-27 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2024-04-27 00:00:00 UTC to 2024-04-28 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2024-04-28 00:00:00 UTC to 2024-04-29 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2024-04-29 00:00:00 UTC to 2024-04-30 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2024-04-30 00:00:00 UTC to 2024-05-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 0 submissions, 1 commentsApr 30

Counts come from the repository’s dated source evidence. Index cutoff: 2026-11-02 08:16:59 UTC.

View mention counts and date ranges
UTC ranges include their start and exclude their end. Select a period to filter the source evidence.
PeriodStart (UTC)End (exclusive, UTC)MentionsSubmissionsComments
Apr 72024-04-07 00:00:00 UTC2024-04-08 00:00:00 UTC101
Apr 82024-04-08 00:00:00 UTC2024-04-09 00:00:00 UTC000
Apr 92024-04-09 00:00:00 UTC2024-04-10 00:00:00 UTC000
Apr 102024-04-10 00:00:00 UTC2024-04-11 00:00:00 UTC000
Apr 112024-04-11 00:00:00 UTC2024-04-12 00:00:00 UTC000
Apr 122024-04-12 00:00:00 UTC2024-04-13 00:00:00 UTC000
Apr 132024-04-13 00:00:00 UTC2024-04-14 00:00:00 UTC000
Apr 142024-04-14 00:00:00 UTC2024-04-15 00:00:00 UTC000
Apr 152024-04-15 00:00:00 UTC2024-04-16 00:00:00 UTC000
Apr 162024-04-16 00:00:00 UTC2024-04-17 00:00:00 UTC000
Apr 172024-04-17 00:00:00 UTC2024-04-18 00:00:00 UTC000
Apr 182024-04-18 00:00:00 UTC2024-04-19 00:00:00 UTC000
Apr 192024-04-19 00:00:00 UTC2024-04-20 00:00:00 UTC000
Apr 202024-04-20 00:00:00 UTC2024-04-21 00:00:00 UTC000
Apr 212024-04-21 00:00:00 UTC2024-04-22 00:00:00 UTC000
Apr 222024-04-22 00:00:00 UTC2024-04-23 00:00:00 UTC000
Apr 232024-04-23 00:00:00 UTC2024-04-24 00:00:00 UTC000
Apr 242024-04-24 00:00:00 UTC2024-04-25 00:00:00 UTC000
Apr 252024-04-25 00:00:00 UTC2024-04-26 00:00:00 UTC000
Apr 262024-04-26 00:00:00 UTC2024-04-27 00:00:00 UTC000
Apr 272024-04-27 00:00:00 UTC2024-04-28 00:00:00 UTC000
Apr 282024-04-28 00:00:00 UTC2024-04-29 00:00:00 UTC000
Apr 292024-04-29 00:00:00 UTC2024-04-30 00:00:00 UTC000
Apr 302024-04-30 00:00:00 UTC2024-05-01 00:00:00 UTC101

What Hacker News says

2 sources
> The performance regression is __not__ big. It's lucky Andres caught it at all. It's also not necessarily all that simple to remove it. It's not simply a bug in a loop or some such. If I was the xz team I'd have enough faith in all the work that was done to give it high odds that they'd get there before discovery. That they'd have time; months, even. True in the contents of sshd logins it isn't that big, but ~500ms to get from _start() to main() isn't small either, compared to the normal cost of that phase of library startup. Their problem was that the sshd daemon fork+exec's itself to handle a connection, so they had to redo a lot of the work for each connection. I suspect they started off with much smaller overhead and then it increased gradually, with every feature they added, just like it happens with many software projects. Here's
Read the rest
the number of symbols being looked that a reversing effort has documented: https://github.com/smx-smx/xzre/blame/ff3ba18a39bad272ff628b... https://github.com/smx-smx/xzre/blob/ff3ba18a39bad272ff628bb... Afaict all of this happens before there's any indication of the attacker's keys being presented - that's not visible to the fork+exec'd sshd until a lot later. They needed to some of the work before main(), to redirect RSA_public_decrypt(). That'd have been some measurable overhead, but not close to 500ms. The rest of the startup could have been deferred until after RSA_public_decrypt() was presented with something looking like their key as part of the ssh certificate.
In The xz sshd backdoor rabbithole goes quite a bit deeper

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