HackerReposA FIELD GUIDE TO OPEN SOURCE
ProSponsor the shelf♧ 0
← Back to top all-time
stpeter
manifesto
Systems & Infrastructure2013–2025
stpeter / manifesto

manifesto

A public statement about ubiquitous encryption on the federated XMPP network.

7Distinct people
10Mentions
0Explicit recommenders
101GitHub stars
REPOSITORY AT A GLANCE

What to know before exploring

What it is

A public statement about ubiquitous encryption on the federated XMPP network.

GitHub

Where it is used

No documented product use has been verified yet.

What people are saying

No recommendation phrase was found in the indexed comments.

No classified warning is attached to this page. Read the discussions before treating silence as approval.

Also in these discussions

No other repository is repeatedly linked in the same discussions.

This week on Hacker News

Nov 7–Nov 14 UTC · Direct repository links and separately labeled related project stories. Indexed through 11/14/2026, 5:04:57 PM UTC.

No direct repository links were found in the indexed HN discussions over the past seven days. Older discussions are available below.

Mentions over time

HN mentions by year10 dated mentions

Observed mentions: 2013-10-29 05:18:18 UTC to 2025-06-17 17:19:14 UTC.

01232013-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2014-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 1 submissions, 0 comments20132014-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2015-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 3 mentions; 2 submissions, 1 comments2015-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2016-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 2 mentions; 0 submissions, 2 comments2016-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2017-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2017-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2018-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 0 submissions, 1 comments2018-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments20192020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 0 submissions, 1 comments2021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 0 submissions, 1 comments2022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 0 submissions, 1 comments2025

Counts come from the repository’s dated source evidence. Index cutoff: 2026-11-02 08:16:59 UTC.

View mention counts and date ranges
UTC ranges include their start and exclude their end. Select a period to filter the source evidence.
PeriodStart (UTC)End (exclusive, UTC)MentionsSubmissionsComments
20132013-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2014-01-01 00:00:00 UTC110
20142014-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2015-01-01 00:00:00 UTC321
20152015-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2016-01-01 00:00:00 UTC202
20162016-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2017-01-01 00:00:00 UTC000
20172017-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2018-01-01 00:00:00 UTC101
20182018-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC000
20192019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC000
20202020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC101
20212021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC101
20222022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC000
20232023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC000
20242024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC000
20252025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2026-01-01 00:00:00 UTC101

What Hacker News says

10 sources
> for me, when both Facebook and Google rejected Jabber/XMPP federation :( I agree with you in principle, but this is only half-true. You're right that Facebook's XMPP was always just a gateway into their proprietary messaging system, but Google did support XMPP federation. What Google did not support was server-to-server TLS, and thus it was “us” who killed Google XMPP federation. In late 2013 there was an XMPP community manifesto calling for mandatory TLS (even STARTTLS) for XMPP server-to-server communication by a drop-dead date in mid 2014: https://github.com/stpeter/manifesto/blob/master/manifesto.t... "The schedule we agree to is: - January 4, 2014: first test day requiring encryption - February 22, 2014: second test day - March 22, 2014: third test day - April 19, 2014: fourth test day - May 19, 2014: permanent upgrade to encrypted
Read the rest
network, coinciding with Open Discussion Day <http://opendiscussionday.org/>" Well-intentioned for sure, but the one XMPP provider with an actual critical mass of users (Google Talk) remained non-TLS-only, all Google Talk users dropped off the federated XMPP network after May 2014, and so XMPP effectively ceased to matter. I'm sure Google were very happy to let us do this.
In The drawbridges come up: the dream of a interconnected context ecosystem is over
> When you are establishing a standard that clients and servers will advertise that they adhere to, don't leave technical decisions to the end-user by default. On principle I agree, but ironically the exact scenario you suggest was the single biggest event that "killed" XMPP as we used to know it. In late 2013 there was an XMPP community manifesto calling for mandatory TLS (even STARTTLS) for XMPP server-to-server communication by a drop-dead date in early 2014: https://github.com/stpeter/manifesto/blob/master/manifesto.t... "The schedule we agree to is: - January 4, 2014: first test day requiring encryption - February 22, 2014: second test day - March 22, 2014: third test day - April 19, 2014: fourth test day - May 19, 2014: permanent upgrade to encrypted network, coinciding with Open Discussion Day <http://opendiscussionday.org/>" Well-
Read the rest
intentioned for sure, but the one XMPP provider with an actual critical mass of users (Google Talk) remained non-TLS-only, all Google Talk users dropped off the federated XMPP network after May 2014, and so XMPP effectively ceased to matter.
In Modern XMPP
My tinfoil hat theory (that others may have had, or it may be something I read somewhere...) is that the XMPP protocol was part of what made PRISM successful, and the timing of these orgs adding XMPP is kind of aligned with when they were “online” for PRISM. I’m pretty sure the larger orgs that were targeted could tell that the only way this information leaked easily, or was justified, was because of XMPP metadata, or some other large scale flaw. The XMPP group also had a pretty visible security/encryption lockdown that I didn’t feel like was explained well, or maybe I just didn’t understand it :) https://github.com/stpeter/manifesto/blob/master/manifesto.t...
In XMPP works – 1 July 2020

MAKE YOURSELF AT HOME

A few shortcuts

/
Search the collection
?
Open this guide
Esc
Close dialogs and navigation

Your saved repositories and interests stay in this browser.