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tc39
proposal-shadowrealm
HTML2018–2026
tc39 / proposal-shadowrealm

proposal-shadowrealm

ECMAScript Proposal, specs, and reference implementation for Realms

16Distinct people
16Mentions
0Explicit recommenders
1.6KGitHub stars
REPOSITORY AT A GLANCE

What to know before exploring

What it is

ECMAScript Proposal, specs, and reference implementation for Realms

GitHub

Where it is used

No documented product use was verified in the last source check.

What people are saying

No recommendation phrase was found in the indexed comments.

No classified warning is attached to this page. Read the discussions before treating silence as approval.

Also in these discussions

Mentioned in the same Hacker News threads. That is not proof they are substitutes.

This week on Hacker News

Nov 8–Nov 15 UTC · Direct repository links and separately labeled related project stories. Indexed through 11/15/2026, 4:00:59 PM UTC.

No direct repository links were found in the indexed HN discussions over the past seven days. Older discussions are available below.

Mentions over time

HN mentions by year16 dated mentions

Observed mentions: 2018-10-05 00:39:16 UTC to 2026-08-30 04:54:54 UTC.

012342018-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 2 mentions; 0 submissions, 2 comments20182019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 4 mentions; 0 submissions, 4 comments2020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 2 mentions; 0 submissions, 2 comments2021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 2 mentions; 0 submissions, 2 comments2022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 3 mentions; 0 submissions, 3 comments20222023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 0 submissions, 1 comments2025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 0 submissions, 1 comments2026-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2027-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 1 submissions, 0 comments. Incomplete calendar period.2026*

* An incomplete calendar period is marked with an outlined bar. Its count is not directly comparable with a full period.

Counts come from the repository’s dated source evidence. Index cutoff: 2026-11-02 08:16:59 UTC.

View mention counts and date ranges
UTC ranges include their start and exclude their end. Select a period to filter the source evidence.
PeriodStart (UTC)End (exclusive, UTC)MentionsSubmissionsComments
20182018-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC202
20192019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC404
20202020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC202
20212021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC202
20222022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC303
20232023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC000
20242024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC101
20252025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2026-01-01 00:00:00 UTC101
2026 (partial)2026-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2027-01-01 00:00:00 UTC110

What Hacker News says

4 sources
When we talk about sandboxing dependencies, we're talking about sandboxing at an API level, not an OS level -- in some languages (particularly memory-unsafe languages) that's difficult, but in general the intention isn't to put dependencies in a separate process; it's to restrict access to dangerous APIs like network requests. Sandboxing might be something like, "I'm importing a function, and I'm going to define a scope, and within that scope, it will have access to these methods, and nothing else." Imagine the following pseudo-code in a fictional, statically typed, rigid langauge. import std from 'std'; import disk from 'io'; import request from 'http'; //This dependency (and its sub-dependencies) can //only call methods in the std library, nothing else. //I can call special_sort anywhere I want and I *know* //it can't mak
Read the rest
e network requests or access the disk. //All it can do is call a few core std libraries. import (std){ special_sort } from 'shady_special_sort'; function save (data) { disk.write('output.log', data); } function safe_save (data) { if (!valid(data)) { return false; } save(data); } function main () { //An on-the-fly sandbox -- access to safe_save and request. (request, safe_save){ save('my_malware_payload'); //compile-time error disk.write('output.log', 'my_malware_payload'); //compile-time error safe_save('my_malware_payload'); //allowed } } We're not treating our dependencies or even our inline code as a service here -- we're not loading the code into a separate process or forcing ourselves to go through a connector to call into the API. We're just defining a static constraint that will stop our program from compiling if the code tries to do something we don't want, it's no different than a type-check. The difference between this and pure static analysis is that static analysis isn't something that's built into the language, and static analysis tries to guess intent. Static analysis says, "that looks shifty, let's alert someone." An language-level sandbox says, "I don't care about the intent, you have access to X and that's it." Even in a dynamic language like JS, when people talk about stuff like the Realms proposal[0][1], they're talking about a system that's a lot closer to the above than they are about creating standalone services that would live in their own processes or threads. This kind of style of thinking about security lends itself particularly well to functional languages and functional coding styles, but there's no reason it can't also work with more traditional class-based approaches as well -- you just have to be more careful about what you're passing around and what has access to what objects. class Dangerous () { unsafe_write (data) { //unvalidated disk access } } class Safe () { public Dangerous ref = new Dangerous(); safe_write (data) { validate(data); ref.unsafe_write(); } } function main () { Dangerous instance = new Dangerous(); (instance){ //I've just accidentally given my sandbox //access to `unsafe_write` because I left //a property public. } } Even with that concern, worrying about my own references is still way, way easier than worrying about an entire, separate codebase that I can't control. [0]: https://github.com/tc39/proposal-realms [1]: https://gist.github.com/dherman/7568885
In Two malicious Python libraries caught stealing SSH and GPG keys

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