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TecharoHQ
anubis
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TecharoHQ / anubis

anubis

Weighs the soul of incoming HTTP requests to stop AI crawlers

67Distinct people
80Mentions
1Explicit recommenders
24.1KGitHub stars
REPOSITORY AT A GLANCE

What to know before exploring

What it is

Weighs the soul of incoming HTTP requests to stop AI crawlers

GitHub

Where it is used

The last source check was inconclusive. This does not establish whether a product uses it.

What people are saying

This is just like security; the most secure system is the one that nobody can use. I think the proof-of-work approach that anubis[0] takes is pretty interesting. I love the…

wolttam used a recommendation phrase. One indexed comment matches. This is a phrase match, not a verdict.

No classified warning is attached to this page. Read the discussions before treating silence as approval.

Also in these discussions

No other repository is repeatedly linked in the same discussions.

This week on Hacker News

Nov 9–Nov 16 UTC · Direct repository links and separately labeled related project stories. Indexed through 11/16/2026, 7:27:27 AM UTC.

No direct repository links were found in the indexed HN discussions over the past seven days. Older discussions are available below.

Mentions over time

HN mentions by month80 dated mentions

Observed mentions: 2025-03-18 05:45:12 UTC to 2026-10-18 18:22:03 UTC.

051015202025-03-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2025-04-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 12 mentions; 3 submissions, 9 commentsMar 20252025-04-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2025-05-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 6 mentions; 0 submissions, 6 comments2025-05-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2025-06-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 5 mentions; 0 submissions, 5 comments2025-06-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2025-07-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 2 mentions; 1 submissions, 1 comments2025-07-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2025-08-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 4 mentions; 1 submissions, 3 comments2025-08-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2025-09-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 20 mentions; 1 submissions, 19 comments2025-09-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2025-10-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 0 submissions, 1 comments2025-10-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2025-11-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 0 submissions, 1 comments2025-11-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2025-12-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 5 mentions; 0 submissions, 5 comments2025-12-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 4 mentions; 0 submissions, 4 commentsDec 20252026-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-02-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2026-02-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-03-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2026-03-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-04-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 0 submissions, 1 comments2026-04-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-05-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 2 mentions; 1 submissions, 1 comments2026-05-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-06-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 2 mentions; 0 submissions, 2 comments2026-06-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-07-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 4 mentions; 0 submissions, 4 comments2026-07-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-08-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 3 mentions; 0 submissions, 3 comments2026-08-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-09-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 4 mentions; 0 submissions, 4 comments2026-09-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-10-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 0 submissions, 1 comments2026-10-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-11-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 3 mentions; 0 submissions, 3 commentsOct 2026

Counts come from the repository’s dated source evidence. Index cutoff: 2026-11-02 08:16:59 UTC.

View mention counts and date ranges
UTC ranges include their start and exclude their end. Select a period to filter the source evidence.
PeriodStart (UTC)End (exclusive, UTC)MentionsSubmissionsComments
Mar 20252025-03-01 00:00:00 UTC2025-04-01 00:00:00 UTC1239
Apr 20252025-04-01 00:00:00 UTC2025-05-01 00:00:00 UTC606
May 20252025-05-01 00:00:00 UTC2025-06-01 00:00:00 UTC505
Jun 20252025-06-01 00:00:00 UTC2025-07-01 00:00:00 UTC211
Jul 20252025-07-01 00:00:00 UTC2025-08-01 00:00:00 UTC413
Aug 20252025-08-01 00:00:00 UTC2025-09-01 00:00:00 UTC20119
Sep 20252025-09-01 00:00:00 UTC2025-10-01 00:00:00 UTC101
Oct 20252025-10-01 00:00:00 UTC2025-11-01 00:00:00 UTC101
Nov 20252025-11-01 00:00:00 UTC2025-12-01 00:00:00 UTC505
Dec 20252025-12-01 00:00:00 UTC2026-01-01 00:00:00 UTC404
Jan 20262026-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2026-02-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Feb 20262026-02-01 00:00:00 UTC2026-03-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Mar 20262026-03-01 00:00:00 UTC2026-04-01 00:00:00 UTC101
Apr 20262026-04-01 00:00:00 UTC2026-05-01 00:00:00 UTC211
May 20262026-05-01 00:00:00 UTC2026-06-01 00:00:00 UTC202
Jun 20262026-06-01 00:00:00 UTC2026-07-01 00:00:00 UTC404
Jul 20262026-07-01 00:00:00 UTC2026-08-01 00:00:00 UTC303
Aug 20262026-08-01 00:00:00 UTC2026-09-01 00:00:00 UTC404
Sep 20262026-09-01 00:00:00 UTC2026-10-01 00:00:00 UTC101
Oct 20262026-10-01 00:00:00 UTC2026-11-01 00:00:00 UTC303

What Hacker News says

5 sources
> Furthermore, if we use a proof-of-work system that's shared with an actual cryptocurrency, so as to actually get payment from these hashes, then we have a new problem: ASICs. Cryptocurrencies have to be secured by a globally agreed-upon hash function, and changing that global consensus to a new hash function is very difficult. And those hashes have economic value. So it makes lots of sense to go build custom hardware just to crack hashes faster and claim more of the inflation schedule and on-chain fees. > If ASICs exist for a given hash function, then proof-of-work fails at both: > - Being an antispam system, since spammers will have better hardware than legitimate users[3] > - Being a billing system, since legitimate users won't be able to mine enough crypto to pay any economically viable amount of money Monero/XMR & Zcash break this p
Read the rest
art of the argument, along with ASIC/GPU-resistant algorithms in general (Argon2 being most well-known & recommended as a KDF). Creating an ASIC-resistant coin is not impossible, as shown by XMR. The difficult part comes from creating & sustaining the network surrounding the coin, and those two are amongst the few that have done both. Furthermore, there's little actual need to create another coin to do so when XMR fulfills that niche. ------ > If you don't insist on using proof-of-work as billing, and only as antispam, then you can invent whatever tortured mess of a hash function is incompatible with commonly available mining ASICs. And since they don't have to be globally agreed-upon, everyone can use a different, incompatible hash function. Counterpoint: People (and devs) want a pre-packaged solution that solves the mentioned antispam problem. For almost everyone, Anubis does its job as intended. https://github.com/TecharoHQ/anubis
In A thought on JavaScript "proof of work" anti-scraper systems
This thing, despite using "captcha" in its name, is not your typical captcha like hCaptcha or Google's one, because it uses a proof-of-work mechanism instead of writing answers in textboxes/clicking on images/other means of verification requiring user input. AI bots can't solve proof-of-work challenges because browsers they use for scraping don't support features needed to solve them. This is highlighted by existence of other proof-of-work solutions designed to specifically filter out AI bots, like go-away[1] or Anubis[2]. And yes, they work - once GNOME deployed one of these proof-of-work challenges on their gitlab instance, traffic on it fell by 97%[3]. [1] - https://git.gammaspectra.live/git/go-away [2] - https://github.com/TecharoHQ/anubis [3] - https://thelibre.news/foss-infrastructure-is-under-attack-by...: "According to Bart Piotro
Read the rest
wski, in around two hours and a half they received 81k total requests, and out of those only 3% passed Anubi's proof of work, hinting at 97% of the traffic being bots."
In Lightweight open source reCaptcha alternative
From looking at some of the rules like https://github.com/TecharoHQ/anubis/blob/main/data/bots/head... it seems that Anubis explicitly punishes bots that are "honest" about their user agent - I might be missing something, but isn't this just pressuring anyone who does anything bot-related to just lie about their user agent? Flat out user-agent blacklist seems really weird, it's going to reward the companies that are more unethical in their scraping practices than the ones who report their user agent truthfully. From the repo it also seems like all the AI crawlers are also DENY, which, again, would reward AI companies that don't disclose their identity in the user agent.
In Anubis saved our websites from a DDoS attack

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