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tenuo-ai
tenuo
Rust2025–2026
tenuo-ai / tenuo

tenuo

Task-scoped authorization for AI agents. Cryptographic warrants constrain tools and arguments, prevent privilege escalation at every delegation hop, and produce signed evidence of what was allowed or denied.

3Distinct people
13Mentions
0Explicit recommenders
106GitHub stars
REPOSITORY AT A GLANCE

What to know before exploring

What it is

Task-scoped authorization for AI agents. Cryptographic warrants constrain tools and arguments, prevent privilege escalation at every delegation hop, and produce signed evidence of what was allowed or denied.

GitHub

Where it is used

No documented product use has been verified yet.

What people are saying

No recommendation phrase was found in the indexed comments.

No classified warning is attached to this page. Read the discussions before treating silence as approval.

Also in these discussions

No other repository is repeatedly linked in the same discussions.

This week on Hacker News

Nov 9–Nov 16 UTC · Direct repository links and separately labeled related project stories. Indexed through 11/16/2026, 4:35:25 PM UTC.

No direct repository links were found in the indexed HN discussions over the past seven days. Older discussions are available below.

Mentions over time

HN mentions by month13 dated mentions

Observed mentions: 2025-12-28 23:26:28 UTC to 2026-10-14 16:17:39 UTC.

012342025-12-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 0 submissions, 1 commentsDec 20252026-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-02-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 2 mentions; 0 submissions, 2 comments2026-02-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-03-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 2 mentions; 1 submissions, 1 comments2026-03-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-04-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 4 mentions; 0 submissions, 4 comments2026-04-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-05-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2026-05-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-06-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 0 submissions, 1 commentsMay 20262026-06-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-07-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2026-07-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-08-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2026-08-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-09-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2026-09-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-10-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2026-10-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-11-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 3 mentions; 1 submissions, 2 commentsOct 2026

Counts come from the repository’s dated source evidence. Index cutoff: 2026-11-02 08:16:59 UTC.

View mention counts and date ranges
UTC ranges include their start and exclude their end. Select a period to filter the source evidence.
PeriodStart (UTC)End (exclusive, UTC)MentionsSubmissionsComments
Dec 20252025-12-01 00:00:00 UTC2026-01-01 00:00:00 UTC101
Jan 20262026-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2026-02-01 00:00:00 UTC202
Feb 20262026-02-01 00:00:00 UTC2026-03-01 00:00:00 UTC211
Mar 20262026-03-01 00:00:00 UTC2026-04-01 00:00:00 UTC404
Apr 20262026-04-01 00:00:00 UTC2026-05-01 00:00:00 UTC000
May 20262026-05-01 00:00:00 UTC2026-06-01 00:00:00 UTC101
Jun 20262026-06-01 00:00:00 UTC2026-07-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Jul 20262026-07-01 00:00:00 UTC2026-08-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Aug 20262026-08-01 00:00:00 UTC2026-09-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Sep 20262026-09-01 00:00:00 UTC2026-10-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Oct 20262026-10-01 00:00:00 UTC2026-11-01 00:00:00 UTC312

What Hacker News says

1 sources
I've been going down this exact rabbit hole for the last few months. The 'opt-in guardrails' problem you mentioned is the dealbreaker. If the agent can just ignore the read_file tool wrapper and call os.system('cat ...'), the policy is useless. I ended up building a 'capability token' primitive (think Macaroons or Google Zanzibar, but for ephemeral agent tasks) to solve this. My approach (Tenuo) works like this: 1. Runtime Enforcement: The agent gets a cryptographically signed 'Warrant' that mechanically limits what the runtime allows. It’s not a 'rule' the LLM follows; it’s a constraint the runtime enforces (e.g., fs:read is only valid for /tmp/*). 2. Attenuation: As the agent creates sub-tasks, it can only delegate less authority than it holds. 3. Offline Verify: I wrote the core in Rust so I can verify these tokens in ~27µs on every si
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ngle tool call without a network round-trip. If you are building a POC, feel free to rip out the core logic or use the crate directly. I’d love to see more tools move away from 'prompt engineering security' toward actual runtime guarantees. Repo: https://github.com/tenuo-ai/tenuo
In How do you secure AI coding agents?

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