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tenuo-ai
tenuo
Rust2025–2026
tenuo-ai / tenuo

tenuo

Task-scoped authorization for AI agents. Cryptographic warrants constrain tools and arguments, prevent privilege escalation at every delegation hop, and produce signed evidence of what was allowed or denied.

3Distinct people
13Mentions
0Explicit recommenders
106GitHub stars
REPOSITORY AT A GLANCE

What to know before exploring

What it is

Task-scoped authorization for AI agents. Cryptographic warrants constrain tools and arguments, prevent privilege escalation at every delegation hop, and produce signed evidence of what was allowed or denied.

GitHub

Where it is used

No documented product use has been verified yet.

What people are saying

No recommendation phrase was found in the indexed comments.

No classified warning is attached to this page. Read the discussions before treating silence as approval.

Also in these discussions

No other repository is repeatedly linked in the same discussions.

This week on Hacker News

Nov 9–Nov 16 UTC · Direct repository links and separately labeled related project stories. Indexed through 11/16/2026, 2:19:09 PM UTC.

No direct repository links were found in the indexed HN discussions over the past seven days. Older discussions are available below.

Mentions over time

HN mentions by month13 dated mentions

Observed mentions: 2025-12-28 23:26:28 UTC to 2026-10-14 16:17:39 UTC.

012342025-12-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 0 submissions, 1 commentsDec 20252026-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-02-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 2 mentions; 0 submissions, 2 comments2026-02-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-03-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 2 mentions; 1 submissions, 1 comments2026-03-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-04-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 4 mentions; 0 submissions, 4 comments2026-04-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-05-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2026-05-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-06-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 0 submissions, 1 commentsMay 20262026-06-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-07-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2026-07-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-08-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2026-08-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-09-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2026-09-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-10-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2026-10-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-11-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 3 mentions; 1 submissions, 2 commentsOct 2026

Counts come from the repository’s dated source evidence. Index cutoff: 2026-11-02 08:16:59 UTC.

View mention counts and date ranges
UTC ranges include their start and exclude their end. Select a period to filter the source evidence.
PeriodStart (UTC)End (exclusive, UTC)MentionsSubmissionsComments
Dec 20252025-12-01 00:00:00 UTC2026-01-01 00:00:00 UTC101
Jan 20262026-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2026-02-01 00:00:00 UTC202
Feb 20262026-02-01 00:00:00 UTC2026-03-01 00:00:00 UTC211
Mar 20262026-03-01 00:00:00 UTC2026-04-01 00:00:00 UTC404
Apr 20262026-04-01 00:00:00 UTC2026-05-01 00:00:00 UTC000
May 20262026-05-01 00:00:00 UTC2026-06-01 00:00:00 UTC101
Jun 20262026-06-01 00:00:00 UTC2026-07-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Jul 20262026-07-01 00:00:00 UTC2026-08-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Aug 20262026-08-01 00:00:00 UTC2026-09-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Sep 20262026-09-01 00:00:00 UTC2026-10-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Oct 20262026-10-01 00:00:00 UTC2026-11-01 00:00:00 UTC312

What Hacker News says

2 sources
Working on this problem: https://github.com/tenuo-ai/tenuo Different angle than policy-as-YAML. We use cryptographic capability tokens (warrants) that travel with the request. The human signs a scoped, time-bound authorization. The tool validates the warrant at execution, not a central policy engine. On your questions: Canonicalization: The warrant specifies allowed capabilities and constraints (e.g., path: /data/reports/*). The tool checks if the action fits the constraint. No need to normalize LLM output into a canonical representation. Stateful intent: Warrants attenuate. Authority only shrinks through delegation. You can't escalate from "read DB" to "POST external" unless the original warrant allowed both. A sub-agent can only receive a subset of what its parent had, cryptographically enforced. Latency: Stateless verification, ~27μs.
Read the rest
No control plane calls. The warrant is self-contained: scope, constraints, expiry, holder binding, signature chain. Verification is local. The deeper issue with policy engines: they check rules against actions, but they can't verify derivation. When Agent B acts, did its authority actually come from Agent A? Was it attenuated correctly? Wrote about why capabilities are the only model that survives dynamic delegation: https://niyikiza.com/posts/capability-delegation/
In Ask HN: How are you handling non-probabilistic security for LLM agents?
Interesting. Are you focused on the delegation chain (how capabilities flow between agents) or the execution boundary (verifying at tool call time)? I've been mostly on the delegation side. Working on this at github.com/tenuo-ai/tenuo. Would love to compare approaches. Email in profile?
In Claude Cowork exfiltrates files

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