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testssl
testssl.sh
Shell2016–2026
testssl / testssl.sh

testssl.sh

Testing TLS/SSL encryption anywhere on any port

7Distinct people
39Mentions
0Explicit recommenders
9.3KGitHub stars
REPOSITORY AT A GLANCE

What to know before exploring

What it is

Testing TLS/SSL encryption anywhere on any port

GitHub

Where it is used

No documented product use has been verified yet.

What people are saying

No recommendation phrase was found in the indexed comments.

No classified warning is attached to this page. Read the discussions before treating silence as approval.

Also in these discussions

No other repository is repeatedly linked in the same discussions.

This week on Hacker News

Nov 8–Nov 15 UTC · Direct repository links and separately labeled related project stories. Indexed through 11/15/2026, 5:58:02 AM UTC.

No direct repository links were found in the indexed HN discussions over the past seven days. Older discussions are available below.

Mentions over time

HN mentions by year39 dated mentions

Observed mentions: 2016-02-03 16:22:53 UTC to 2026-05-03 15:22:54 UTC.

024682016-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2017-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 2 mentions; 0 submissions, 2 comments20162017-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2018-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 0 submissions, 1 comments2018-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 3 mentions; 3 submissions, 0 comments2019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 6 mentions; 2 submissions, 4 comments2020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 4 mentions; 3 submissions, 1 comments2021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 7 mentions; 5 submissions, 2 comments20212022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 8 mentions; 1 submissions, 7 comments2023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 2 mentions; 0 submissions, 2 comments2024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 0 submissions, 1 comments2025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 3 mentions; 0 submissions, 3 comments2026-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2027-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 2 mentions; 1 submissions, 1 comments. Incomplete calendar period.2026*

* An incomplete calendar period is marked with an outlined bar. Its count is not directly comparable with a full period.

Counts come from the repository’s dated source evidence. Index cutoff: 2026-11-02 08:16:59 UTC.

View mention counts and date ranges
UTC ranges include their start and exclude their end. Select a period to filter the source evidence.
PeriodStart (UTC)End (exclusive, UTC)MentionsSubmissionsComments
20162016-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2017-01-01 00:00:00 UTC202
20172017-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2018-01-01 00:00:00 UTC101
20182018-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC330
20192019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC624
20202020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC431
20212021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC752
20222022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC817
20232023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC202
20242024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC101
20252025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2026-01-01 00:00:00 UTC303
2026 (partial)2026-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2027-01-01 00:00:00 UTC211

What Hacker News says

3 sources
We also it at my work, where it's used both for mass scans of internal hosts, and scanning the same host many times during incidents/configuration changes. And the 20s is extra annoying because it's completely unnecessary. The tool is so slow because it's thousands of lines of pure bash, manipulating individual bytes. And because it's bash, it also breaks in confusing ways when you look at it wrong[1]. [1] https://github.com/testssl/testssl.sh/pull/2429
In SSL Configuration Generator
Seems like they support more than 3DES. It might be interesting if they shared stats on how many legit MTA's are using old ciphers. Should exclude bots, scanners, etc... There are of course other mitigating factors such as PGP encrypting emails, accepting that some information is still disclosed. That can be further mitigated by using gmail to only perform the initial communication then go out of band for anything sensitive. SSLv2 not offered (OK) SSLv3 not offered (OK) TLS 1 offered (deprecated) TLS 1.1 offered (deprecated) TLS 1.2 offered (OK) TLS 1.3 offered (OK): final Testing cipher categories NULL ciphers (no encryption) not offered (OK) Anonymous NULL Ciphers (no authentication) not offered (OK) Export ciphers (w/o A
Read the rest
DH+NULL) not offered (OK) LOW: 64 Bit + DES, RC[2,4], MD5 (w/o export) not offered (OK) Triple DES Ciphers / IDEA offered Obsoleted CBC ciphers (AES, ARIA etc.) offered Strong encryption (AEAD ciphers) with no FS offered (OK) Forward Secrecy strong encryption (AEAD ciphers) offered (OK) Tested with testssl.sh [1] [1] - https://github.com/testssl/testssl.sh
In Gmail will soon stop support for the 3DES encryption cipher for incoming SMTP

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