stealth

I... [3] https://github.com/tholian-network/stealth (ongoing rewrite in golang)

of an ISP: - Randomization of TLS fingerprint, in the sense that the order of offered ciphers in the handshake, the TCP window size etc is randomized. - Traffic scattering (e.g. have multiple exit nodes that are selected via a ronin to request the resources from each website) - Traffic "trailing", which inserts random amount of NULL bytes at the end (with randomized encodings, e.g. chunked encoding, gzip Transfer Encoding, etc) - Offline cache for both HTTP/S, DNS and WS/WebRTC in the Browser, so that websites continue to work when they've been requested already. A lot of the Browser cache mechanics are useless because webservers are implementing stupid understandings of ETags which won't work with Tor due to them being connection-specific - Cache headers have to be modified by the Tor proxy, because they can be abused for fingerprinting. ETag and Last-Modified date headers in combination with the Pragma/Cache headers can be used to uniquely re-identify Browser clients on the other end (e.g. by using a fixed datetime in the past for each new client like 1970-01-02 03:04:05). - User-Agent headers have to be randomized and sticky to Tabs and what the website in those Tabs request, even when they're seemingly foreign domains; but even more so when those domains have a CNAME entry. In the past I implemented a lot of the mentioned concepts into the Stealth prototype [1] which aimed to solve this by offering a local Proxy which routes/modifies/cleans network traffic and can be used by a webview that points to it (no matter whether it's a mobile or desktop one); but I had to shift focus with my efforts to cyber defense because we Europeans are getting hit by a lot of "Kremlin-loving hacker groups". At some point I wanted to revisit these ideas again, but who knows what the future holds. [1] https://github.com/tholian-network/stealth

nnels, and pwnat work already pretty failsafe. What's missing is UPnP support so that it behaves a little more gracefully when a router would be cooperative in nature, but after trying to implement the "specification" a bunch of times I skipped it for now. Lots of work to be done though, and had to focus on couple of other things first before I can get back to the project. The browser is part of a larger network that's trying to automate cyber threat intelligence on a peer to peer level, so clients, servers, websites and domains have a trust ratio and a history of trust to prevent misclassification of a new domain owner that e.g. defaced a website or tries to inject their malicious assets up unto previously trusted peers. [1] https://github.com/tholian-network/stealth

text content, image content, audio content etc. News websites are the prime example of how "wrong" ads can get. Autoplayed videos, dozens of popups, flashing advertisements and I haven't even had time to read a single paragraph of the article. And to get ahead of the "if fanboy gets hit by the bus" problem... we need to crowdsource this kind of meta information in a decentralized and distributed manner. [1] https://github.com/tholian-network/stealth

t the Browser itself is actually a locally running peer-to-peer web scraper service, and the "frontend or GUI" is a bundled webview that's pointing to localhost:someport. Web Apps can then be used by spawning a new webview instance that's sandboxed with its profile in a temporary folder, so it cannot infect/spread across the regular profile folder that's being used for the "regular private browsing" mode. This architecture allows all kinds of benefits, as everything can be filtered, cleaned, verified (, and shared with other peers) at the network level before it reaches the webview - whereas Browser Extensions currently cannot filter any HTTP responses because there's no API for that. AdBlockers currently are based on a disallow-list based concept, which means the advantage is always on the advertising side, and by default nothing is filtered; and scammers/blackhats have always the advantage. Once you add it to a filter list, lots of people's machines have been compromised already. But what if AdBlockers change instead to an allow-list based concept - meaning that the Browser maintains a list of resources that are allowed to load per-domain, and the default being just text and images? If you want to take a look at where it's at right now [1] [2], my Browser is open source; and I hope to fund development via a access fees for a peer-to-peer "Knowledge Tracker" that allows to share automations for the web with other peers, aka macros, reader-mode like extraction beacons, and other awesome treats (p2p search and recommendations are basically included in this concept). [1] https://github.com/tholian-network/stealth [2] https://github.com/tholian-network/retrokit

nally think this is the only way to be untrackable these days. Because let's be honest, nobody uses Firefox with ETP in my town anymore :( WebKit was a good start of this because at least some of the features were implemented behind compiler flags...whereas all other browsers and engines can't be built without say, WebRTC support, or say, without Audio Worklets which are for themselves enough to be uniquely identified. [1] https://github.com/tholian-network/stealth [2] https://github.com/tholian-network/retrokit (both WIP)

nses especially not when chunked encoding can be a requested thing. Don't get me started on the ";q=x.y" value headers, they are buggy everywhere, too. For my browser project, I had to build a pcap (tcpdump) based test runner [2] that can setup temporary local networks with throttling and fragmentation behaviour so that I have reproducible tests that I can analyze later when they failed. Otherwise it would be a useless network protocol test that's implementation specific as all others. I think the web heavily needs a standard HTTP test suite, similar to the ACID tests back then...but for malicious and spec compliant HTTP payloads combined. [1] https://github.com/tholian-network/stealth [2] https://github.com/tholian-network/stealth/tree/X0/covert

P-NAT could also be censored when it comes to blocked websites, modified DNS responses etc). At this point it's a big experiment and I'm not sure whether I'm fundamentally wrong about this as I don't have any data to back it up. If you're curious, it's part of the Stealth Browser I'm building [1] and [2] [1] https://github.com/tholian-network/stealth [2] https://github.com/tholian-network/stealth-vendor

delivering network with a trustless cryptography based peer-to-peer end-to-end encrypted statistically-correct cache is certainly feasible. I believe that because that's exactly what I'm building for the last two years [1]. [1] https://github.com/tholian-network/stealth