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thoughtworks
talisman
Go2017–2020
thoughtworks / talisman

talisman

Using a pre-commit hook, Talisman validates the outgoing changeset for things that look suspicious — such as tokens, passwords, and private keys.

5Distinct people
5Mentions
0Explicit recommenders
2.1KGitHub stars
REPOSITORY AT A GLANCE

What to know before exploring

What it is

Using a pre-commit hook, Talisman validates the outgoing changeset for things that look suspicious — such as tokens, passwords, and private keys.

GitHub

Where it is used

No documented product use has been verified yet.

What people are saying

No recommendation phrase was found in the indexed comments.

No classified warning is attached to this page. Read the discussions before treating silence as approval.

Also in these discussions

No other repository is repeatedly linked in the same discussions.

This week on Hacker News

Nov 7–Nov 14 UTC · Direct repository links and separately labeled related project stories. Indexed through 11/14/2026, 3:56:07 PM UTC.

No direct repository links were found in the indexed HN discussions over the past seven days. Older discussions are available below.

Mentions over time

HN mentions by year5 dated mentions

Observed mentions: 2017-11-22 02:50:10 UTC to 2020-11-07 11:06:52 UTC.

01232017-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2018-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 2 mentions; 0 submissions, 2 comments20172018-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments20182019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 3 mentions; 0 submissions, 3 comments2020

Counts come from the repository’s dated source evidence. Index cutoff: 2026-11-02 08:16:59 UTC.

View mention counts and date ranges
UTC ranges include their start and exclude their end. Select a period to filter the source evidence.
PeriodStart (UTC)End (exclusive, UTC)MentionsSubmissionsComments
20172017-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2018-01-01 00:00:00 UTC202
20182018-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC000
20192019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC000
20202020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC303

What Hacker News says

5 sources
Greetings fellow Hackers! OP here. I see that my experiment got some traction which means more awareness should be spread about this class of bugs. For starters I recommend reading "How Bad Can It Git" [1] and "Detecting and Mitigating Secret-Key Leaks inSource Code Repositories" [2] papers. After that you can read "How I made $10K in bug bounties from GitHub secret leaks" [3] and some notable reports on HackerOne Hacktivity [4] [5] and [6]. This last one is interesting - leaking secrets is not only about code repository! Actually it's about entire toolset used for software development, hence secret scanning could (should?) be performed for other places such as CICD logs or even Slack messages [7]. Anyhow, back to code repositories. GitHub and GitLab both recognized secrets as a problem, so they came up with solutions. If you use GitHub y
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ou can easily integrate GitGuardian [8] into your workflow ($$$) but even if you don't GitHub provides you with Secret Scanning feature [9] (both are mentioned within the Twitter and HN threads). If you use GitLab you have a Secret Detection feature [10] at your disposal BUT in order to use it you need to setup Auto DevOps (that's why in my experiment GitLab didn't alert me - I just pushed commits to my public repo but didn't setup anything). Apart from built-in solutions provided by GitHub and GitLab, one can use tooling of their own choice. For this I'd recommend two types of solutions: proactive and reactive. For proactive security, as mentioned in the Twitter thread, you can use Talisman [11] as pre-commit hook. For reactive security you can use GitLeaks [12] (used by GitLab) or similar tools - there are many of them but one stands out, namely truffleHog [13] which can sniff each and every commit across all branches (also used by GitLab). What if you already commited a secret into the public repository? Start with revoking and continue with this tutorial [14] gl, hf. [1] https://www.ndss-symposium.org/ndss-paper/how-bad-can-it-git... [2] https://people.eecs.berkeley.edu/~rohanpadhye/files/key_leak... [3] https://tillsongalloway.com/finding-sensitive-information-on... [4] https://hackerone.com/reports/716292 [5] https://hackerone.com/reports/396467 [6] https://hackerone.com/reports/496937 [7] https://github.com/PaperMtn/slack-watchman [8] https://www.gitguardian.com/ [9] https://developer.github.com/partnerships/secret-scanning/ [10] https://docs.gitlab.com/ee/user/application_security/sast/#s... [11] https://github.com/thoughtworks/talisman [12] https://github.com/zricethezav/gitleaks [13] https://github.com/dxa4481/truffleHog [14] https://docs.github.com/en/free-pro-team@latest/github/authe...
In What will happen when you commit secrets to a public Git repo?
There are a few considerations on that one, but one very practical reason is the developer experience of dealing with false positives. False positives are one of the big problems in secret scanning. Some partners issue credentials with patterns that make them very hard to distinguish from innocuous strings. For example, a Datadog token looks identical to a commit SHA. We would never block developers from pushing commits to GitHub just because they had 40 character hexadecimal strings in them! GitHub's partnership approach works around the false positive problem by having the token issuer check whether a token is real and take action only if it is. However, this is a one-way communication from GitHub - the token issuer doesn't need to tell us whether the candidate secret we sent them was real or not, and in most cases we never know. As a r
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esult, we can't replicate the zero false positive experience in a pre-receive hook (i.e., before the commit is pushed to GitHub). There would also be performance considerations from making 30+ http requests as part of a pre-receive hook. In future, we are looking at creating a pre-receive hook solution that focuses on patterns that have a very low false positive rate. There are already some open source solutions that do this (links below) - in fact the OP linked to one from his Twitter thread. If/when GitHub offer is, it will definitely be opt-in, rather than opt-out! * https://github.com/thoughtworks/talisman/ * https://github.com/awslabs/git-secrets
In What will happen when you commit secrets to a public Git repo?

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