HackerReposA FIELD GUIDE TO OPEN SOURCE
ProSponsor the shelf♧ 0
← Back to top all-time
tillitis
tkey-verification
Go2023–2024
tillitis / tkey-verification

tkey-verification

Vendor signing and user verification of TKey genuineness

3Distinct people
3Mentions
0Explicit recommenders
45GitHub stars
REPOSITORY AT A GLANCE

What to know before exploring

What it is

Vendor signing and user verification of TKey genuineness

GitHub

Where it is used

No documented product use has been verified yet.

What people are saying

No recommendation phrase was found in the indexed comments.

No classified warning is attached to this page. Read the discussions before treating silence as approval.

Also in these discussions

No other repository is repeatedly linked in the same discussions.

This week on Hacker News

Nov 9–Nov 16 UTC · Direct repository links and separately labeled related project stories. Indexed through 11/16/2026, 10:50:02 AM UTC.

No direct repository links were found in the indexed HN discussions over the past seven days. Older discussions are available below.

Mentions over time

HN mentions by week3 dated mentions

Observed mentions: 2023-12-26 12:22:33 UTC to 2024-03-27 15:33:29 UTC. Weeks start Monday, UTC.

0122023-12-25 00:00:00 UTC to 2024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 0 submissions, 1 commentsDec 252024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2024-01-08 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2024-01-08 00:00:00 UTC to 2024-01-15 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2024-01-15 00:00:00 UTC to 2024-01-22 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2024-01-22 00:00:00 UTC to 2024-01-29 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2024-01-29 00:00:00 UTC to 2024-02-05 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2024-02-05 00:00:00 UTC to 2024-02-12 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 commentsFeb 52024-02-12 00:00:00 UTC to 2024-02-19 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2024-02-19 00:00:00 UTC to 2024-02-26 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2024-02-26 00:00:00 UTC to 2024-03-04 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2024-03-04 00:00:00 UTC to 2024-03-11 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2024-03-11 00:00:00 UTC to 2024-03-18 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2024-03-18 00:00:00 UTC to 2024-03-25 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2024-03-25 00:00:00 UTC to 2024-04-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 2 mentions; 0 submissions, 2 commentsMar 25

Counts come from the repository’s dated source evidence. Index cutoff: 2026-11-02 08:16:59 UTC.

View mention counts and date ranges
UTC ranges include their start and exclude their end. Select a period to filter the source evidence.
PeriodStart (UTC)End (exclusive, UTC)MentionsSubmissionsComments
Dec 252023-12-25 00:00:00 UTC2024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC101
Jan 12024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2024-01-08 00:00:00 UTC000
Jan 82024-01-08 00:00:00 UTC2024-01-15 00:00:00 UTC000
Jan 152024-01-15 00:00:00 UTC2024-01-22 00:00:00 UTC000
Jan 222024-01-22 00:00:00 UTC2024-01-29 00:00:00 UTC000
Jan 292024-01-29 00:00:00 UTC2024-02-05 00:00:00 UTC000
Feb 52024-02-05 00:00:00 UTC2024-02-12 00:00:00 UTC000
Feb 122024-02-12 00:00:00 UTC2024-02-19 00:00:00 UTC000
Feb 192024-02-19 00:00:00 UTC2024-02-26 00:00:00 UTC000
Feb 262024-02-26 00:00:00 UTC2024-03-04 00:00:00 UTC000
Mar 42024-03-04 00:00:00 UTC2024-03-11 00:00:00 UTC000
Mar 112024-03-11 00:00:00 UTC2024-03-18 00:00:00 UTC000
Mar 182024-03-18 00:00:00 UTC2024-03-25 00:00:00 UTC000
Mar 252024-03-25 00:00:00 UTC2024-04-01 00:00:00 UTC202

What Hacker News says

1 sources
Yes. I've described some of the flexibility characteristics elsewhere in this thread, but here's how you could do it: 1. The ROM stage measures the first mutable application stage A1, and makes the Compound Device Identifier (CDI) available to A1. CDI=Hash(UDS, Hash(A1), USS). 2. A1 creates a key pair for itself using CDI. 3. A1 measures A2 and creates a key pair for A2. 4. A1 signs A2's public key. This is the attestation. 5. A1 scrubs CDI and its private key from memory while ensuring that the attestation as well as A2's key pair is available to A2. Note that the TKey only supports two-stage boot chains at the moment. A1's key pair could also be signed by the vendor before shipping. We do it like this: https://github.com/tillitis/tkey-verification
In TKey is a RISC-V computer in a USB-C case, that can run security applications

MAKE YOURSELF AT HOME

A few shortcuts

/
Search the collection
?
Open this guide
Esc
Close dialogs and navigation

Your saved repositories and interests stay in this browser.