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tink-crypto
tink
Java2017–2023
tink-crypto / tink · Archived

tink

Tink is a multi-language, cross-platform, open source library that provides cryptographic APIs that are secure, easy to use correctly, and hard(er) to misuse.

18Distinct people
31Mentions
1Explicit recommenders
13.5KGitHub stars
REPOSITORY AT A GLANCE

What to know before exploring

What it is

Tink is a multi-language, cross-platform, open source library that provides cryptographic APIs that are secure, easy to use correctly, and hard(er) to misuse.

GitHub

Where it is used

No documented product use was verified in the last source check.

What people are saying

I recommend looking at GitHub.com/google/tink which helps a lot for things like AEAD

weitzj used a recommendation phrase. One indexed comment matches. This is a phrase match, not a verdict.

No classified warning is attached to this page. Read the discussions before treating silence as approval.

Also in these discussions

Mentioned in the same Hacker News threads. That is not proof they are substitutes.

This week on Hacker News

Nov 9–Nov 16 UTC · Direct repository links and separately labeled related project stories. Indexed through 11/16/2026, 10:50:02 AM UTC.

No direct repository links were found in the indexed HN discussions over the past seven days. Older discussions are available below.

Mentions over time

HN mentions by year31 dated mentions

Observed mentions: 2017-05-19 13:24:29 UTC to 2023-08-09 20:08:05 UTC.

0510152017-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2018-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 3 mentions; 1 submissions, 2 comments20172018-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 4 mentions; 4 submissions, 0 comments2019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 2 mentions; 0 submissions, 2 comments2020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 15 mentions; 3 submissions, 12 comments20202021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 3 mentions; 1 submissions, 2 comments2022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 2 mentions; 0 submissions, 2 comments2023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 2 mentions; 0 submissions, 2 comments2023

Counts come from the repository’s dated source evidence. Index cutoff: 2026-11-02 08:16:59 UTC.

View mention counts and date ranges
UTC ranges include their start and exclude their end. Select a period to filter the source evidence.
PeriodStart (UTC)End (exclusive, UTC)MentionsSubmissionsComments
20172017-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2018-01-01 00:00:00 UTC312
20182018-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC440
20192019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC202
20202020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC15312
20212021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC312
20222022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC202
20232023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC202

What Hacker News says

3 sources
The discussion of the original article (The PGP Problem) got a lot of comments on HN 2 years ago: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=20455780 (googler, opinions are my own) Over at payments in Google, we still use PGP for communicating with the financial world (JWE supported too)[0]. The one advantage of PGP is that it's been around so long, many companies already have it set up in their systems when communicating with them. Be it files or application level communications, support is already there. PGP definitely has it's rough edges. Tools with simplified APIs like Tink[1] seems to be the way security researches want to go, as PGP definitely makes it easy to do things wrong (just due to how much legacy support it has out there). [0] https://developers.google.com/standard-payments/guides/conne... [1] https://github.com/google/tink
In The PGP Problem: A Critique (2020)
TL;DR: this code should've never passed audit. I've found numerous problems, but I'll focus on the attack that lets someone successfully manipulate a ciphertext and have it successfully decrypt as something else. While the audit report says "Boxcryptor is not enforcing integrity [of ciphertexts]," this attack can let an adversary decrypt a (short) ciphertext, given a padding oracle. This company should've never rolled their own crypto in response to Authenticated Encryption, which has been solved, if you just use a pre-existing library. I'm surprised that this code has a "successful" audit. The cryptography _protocol_ that is implemented in the linked github repo (https://github.com/secomba/boxcryptor-single-file-decryptor) has several flaws (in addition to having some bad code practices that I'll skip over since this repo is supposed to
Read the rest
only document the encryption protocols). First, the authors' problems appear to stem from their choice to manually implement an unusual (and inefficient) construction of the Authenticated Encryption primitive. Authenticated Encryption is the most common crypto primitive that people when they say "they want encryption." It's placed front-and-center in libsodium, ring, mundane, tink, monocypher, and every modern cryptography library that I've seen, since it is such a common operation. Modern Authenticated Encryption constructions include: AES-GCM, (X)ChaCha20-Poly1305. While there exist others, the industry has converged on these two as the standard. These block cipher modes did not emerge for no reason. The cryptography community has steadily iterated on what the default should be when somebody asks, "how can I encrypt my file." We've arrived at these constructions, in particular, because previous constructions have had security flaws. The authors of this repo have chosen to use the following protocol (for decryptDataPBKDF2): 1. Derive two keys (KE, KH) from a password string using PBKDF2. KE is the encryption key used with AES, and KH is an HMAC key (used for multiple purposes, which is problematic). 2. Read the AES-CBC initialization vector, IV. Read the AES-CBC ciphertext, C. 3. Check HMAC(KH, C) == the tag in the file. 4. Output AES-CBC-DECRYPT(KE, IV, C) with PKCS#5 padding. The core of the problem is that, while they use the HMAC to check that the ciphertext is authentic (which is a bit odd, given that they seem to claim that authenticity shouldn't matter), they never check that the IV is authentic (it's never computed in the HMAC). The way that AES-CBC decryption works, for first 16-bytes of the decryption is AES-BLOCK-DECRYPT(KE, first 16 bytes of C) XOR IV. As a result, if the IV isn't authenticated (which it's not), then any bit that the attacker flips in the IV will flip the corresponding bit in the ciphertext. Because PKCS#5 padding is used, given a padding oracle, an adversary could decrypt messages under 16 bytes in length. The moral of the story is DO NOT ROLL YOUR OWN CRYPTO! Rolling your own crypto can be fun and educational and informative, but DON'T DEPLOY IT! This bug should not have arisen, because the GitHub link in this blog post should've been to https://github.com/google/tink or https://github.com/jedisct1/libsodium or some library like them.
In Independent Audit: Insights into the Source Code of Boxcryptor

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