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tlswg
tls13-spec
Python2016–2018
tlswg / tls13-spec

tls13-spec

TLS 1.3 Specification

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12Distinct people
12Mentions
0Explicit recommenders
579GitHub stars
REPOSITORY AT A GLANCE

What to know before exploring

What it is

TLS 1.3 Specification

GitHub

Where it is used

No documented product use was verified in the last source check.

What people are saying

No recommendation phrase was found in the indexed comments.

No classified warning is attached to this page. Read the discussions before treating silence as approval.

Also in these discussions

No other repository is repeatedly linked in the same discussions.

This week on Hacker News

Nov 7–Nov 14 UTC · Direct repository links and separately labeled related project stories. Indexed through 11/14/2026, 5:04:57 PM UTC.

No direct repository links were found in the indexed HN discussions over the past seven days. Older discussions are available below.

Mentions over time

HN mentions by month12 dated mentions

Observed mentions: 2016-08-31 20:56:21 UTC to 2018-12-27 12:40:55 UTC.

01232016-08-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2016-09-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 2 mentions; 1 submissions, 1 commentsAug 20162016-09-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2016-10-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2016-10-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2016-11-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 0 submissions, 1 comments2016-11-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2016-12-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2016-12-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2017-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2017-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2017-02-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2017-02-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2017-03-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2017-03-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2017-04-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2017-04-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2017-05-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 0 submissions, 1 comments2017-05-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2017-06-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2017-06-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2017-07-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 3 mentions; 0 submissions, 3 comments2017-07-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2017-08-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2017-08-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2017-09-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2017-09-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2017-10-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2017-10-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2017-11-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 commentsOct 20172017-11-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2017-12-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 1 submissions, 0 comments2017-12-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2018-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 0 submissions, 1 comments2018-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2018-02-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2018-02-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2018-03-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2018-03-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2018-04-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 0 submissions, 1 comments2018-04-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2018-05-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2018-05-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2018-06-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2018-06-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2018-07-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2018-07-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2018-08-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 0 submissions, 1 comments2018-08-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2018-09-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2018-09-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2018-10-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2018-10-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2018-11-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2018-11-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2018-12-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2018-12-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 0 submissions, 1 commentsDec 2018

Counts come from the repository’s dated source evidence. Index cutoff: 2026-11-02 08:16:59 UTC.

View mention counts and date ranges
UTC ranges include their start and exclude their end. Select a period to filter the source evidence.
PeriodStart (UTC)End (exclusive, UTC)MentionsSubmissionsComments
Aug 20162016-08-01 00:00:00 UTC2016-09-01 00:00:00 UTC211
Sep 20162016-09-01 00:00:00 UTC2016-10-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Oct 20162016-10-01 00:00:00 UTC2016-11-01 00:00:00 UTC101
Nov 20162016-11-01 00:00:00 UTC2016-12-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Dec 20162016-12-01 00:00:00 UTC2017-01-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Jan 20172017-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2017-02-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Feb 20172017-02-01 00:00:00 UTC2017-03-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Mar 20172017-03-01 00:00:00 UTC2017-04-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Apr 20172017-04-01 00:00:00 UTC2017-05-01 00:00:00 UTC101
May 20172017-05-01 00:00:00 UTC2017-06-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Jun 20172017-06-01 00:00:00 UTC2017-07-01 00:00:00 UTC303
Jul 20172017-07-01 00:00:00 UTC2017-08-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Aug 20172017-08-01 00:00:00 UTC2017-09-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Sep 20172017-09-01 00:00:00 UTC2017-10-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Oct 20172017-10-01 00:00:00 UTC2017-11-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Nov 20172017-11-01 00:00:00 UTC2017-12-01 00:00:00 UTC110
Dec 20172017-12-01 00:00:00 UTC2018-01-01 00:00:00 UTC101
Jan 20182018-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2018-02-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Feb 20182018-02-01 00:00:00 UTC2018-03-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Mar 20182018-03-01 00:00:00 UTC2018-04-01 00:00:00 UTC101
Apr 20182018-04-01 00:00:00 UTC2018-05-01 00:00:00 UTC000
May 20182018-05-01 00:00:00 UTC2018-06-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Jun 20182018-06-01 00:00:00 UTC2018-07-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Jul 20182018-07-01 00:00:00 UTC2018-08-01 00:00:00 UTC101
Aug 20182018-08-01 00:00:00 UTC2018-09-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Sep 20182018-09-01 00:00:00 UTC2018-10-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Oct 20182018-10-01 00:00:00 UTC2018-11-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Nov 20182018-11-01 00:00:00 UTC2018-12-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Dec 20182018-12-01 00:00:00 UTC2019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC101

What Hacker News says

12 sources
DyslexicAtheist·Dec 27, 2018
the TLS1.3 talk was pretty amazing. I think implementing 0-RTT in a way that it's on by default and can be deactivated is a bad idea[0] (as we know in practice the majority won't mess with defaults). Also the middlebox issues raised by the banking industry[1] and now addressed by the ETSI Middlebox[2] standard is a bad idea. Because this was a crucial design decision in the standard meant to improve security in 1.3 and ETSI is breaking this security with "mTLS". Three is a complaint by IETF against ETSI for copyright violation[3] which also mentions how the security is being weakened in this proposed standard: > We agree with the statement in the document that what it calls "eTLS" is an"implementation variant of Transport Layer Security (TLS) version 1.3" and that unmodified TLS 1.3 clients can interoperate with MSP servers. At a protocol
Read the rest
level, the main area of divergence from TLS 1.3 to this MSP profile is the replacement of the server’s "ephemeral" DH key with a "static" DH key, which suffices to violate the design and operational assumptions of TLS 1.3 and render this MSP profile as a qualitatively different protocol that should be named accordingly. [0] https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/issues/1001 [1] https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg21278.h... [2] https://www.etsi.org/news-events/events/1338-2018-10-webinar... [3] https://datatracker.ietf.org/liaison/1616/ also the China SCS talk is amazing. A lot of these ideas are being eyed by Western technocrats. It's just our language/propaganda is different) so people are less aware that it happens. Expect more of these ideas gain traction all over the world. We certainly got our work cut out. The fight is real y'all :( EDIT: links and more context
In 35th Chaos Communication Congress Live Streams
cesarb·Mar 24, 2018
The final version is going to be basically the last draft (draft-ietf-tls-tls13-28) with a few editorial changes. There's a changelog in the draft: https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-tls13-28#section-... The question is just which draft Chrome and Firefox were using back then. The changes for the middleboxes were according to the changelog in draft-22, and IIRC consisted basically in adding back a few unnecessary fields, and allowing an useless handshake message (which is ignored by the receiver). The main trick was IIRC to make all TLS 1.3 connections (resume or not) appear identical to a TLS 1.2 resume connection. A more detailed history of all changes to the spec can be found at its git repository: https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/
In TLS 1.3 approved
colmmacc·Dec 23, 2017
The IETF TLS working group has included a relevant suggestion in the TLS1.3 draft RFC: https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/commit/465de0e189b2b5909... The idea is simple: use two different instances of a secure RNG. One for "public" material that can be seen on the wire, which would include server and client random data. Another for "secret" material such as the private parts of DH parameters. With that set up, it's hard to impossible for DUAL_EC style attacks to work. Even if the RNG is "broken", there's nothing public to go-on to hint at what the state might be. We've been doing this in Amazon s2n since the first version, and I believe BouncyCastle does it too. Hopefully we'll see more implementations pick up the technique.
In The strange story of “Extended Random”
rrdharan·Jun 14, 2017
Found a nice write-up of these issues here for anyone else interested: https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/issues/1001 TLS 1.3 0-RTT is not secure by default, but it is possible to provide both anti-replay and forward-secrecy properties for 0-RTT data with workarounds. As long as TLS 1.3 is not secure by default it is likely to lead to exploitable vulnerabilities that can only be fixed at the application level, distant from the cause. In general, it is also very challenging to fix applications to be idempotent and side-effect free. Instead of shifting the problem to applications, we should strongly consider modifying the TLS 1.3 draft to make TLS 0-RTT secure by default, at least against replays. While Gillmor-style retry attacks will persist, these attacks may be mitigated with reasonable client behavior, and in many cases the existing c
Read the rest
lient behavior is already fault tolerant.
In TLS 1.3 at Apple
daenney·Jun 14, 2017
It's also a contested one as it can open one up to issues. Some of these are detailed here, for example: https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/issues/1001 It seems prudent to not support something like 0-RTT until the consequences of it are well understood and an informed decision can be made on if the increased speed is worth its trade-offs and how best to protect the data in transit from its potential issues.
In TLS 1.3 at Apple
shthed·Oct 5, 2016
Late to the party.. heh, they agreed to remove RSA Key Transport back in April 2014, implemented in draft 02 https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg12266.h... > The consensus in the room at IETF-89 was to remove RSA key transport from TLS 1.3. If you have concerns about this decision please respond on the TLS list by April 11, 2014. https://threatpost.com/tls-1-3-working-group-has-consensus-t... https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/commit/5d861d58b8a5ef2e8...
In Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3

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