DEdetaro·Jun 27, 2017
It already is, if you build 1.13 with the right OpenSSL.
https://nginx.org/en/docs/http/ngx_http_ssl_module.html#ssl_...
https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/wiki/Implementations
In How HTTPS Handshake Happenstlswg
tls13-spec
Python2016–2018
tlswg / tls13-spec
tls13-spec
TLS 1.3 Specification
12Distinct people
12Mentions
0Explicit recommenders
579GitHub stars
What to know before exploring
What it is
TLS 1.3 Specification
GitHub
Where it is used
No documented product use was verified in the last source check.
What people are saying
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No classified warning is attached to this page. Read the discussions before treating silence as approval.
Also in these discussions
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This week on Hacker News
Nov 8–Nov 15 UTC · Direct repository links and separately labeled related project stories. Indexed through 11/15/2026, 3:38:16 PM UTC.
No direct repository links were found in the indexed HN discussions over the past seven days. Older discussions are available below.
Mentions over time
HN mentions by month12 dated mentions
Observed mentions: 2016-08-31 20:56:21 UTC to 2018-12-27 12:40:55 UTC.
Counts come from the repository’s dated source evidence. Index cutoff: 2026-11-02 08:16:59 UTC.
View mention counts and date ranges
| Period | Start (UTC) | End (exclusive, UTC) | Mentions | Submissions | Comments |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Aug 2016 | 2016-08-01 00:00:00 UTC | 2016-09-01 00:00:00 UTC | 2 | 1 | 1 |
| Sep 2016 | 2016-09-01 00:00:00 UTC | 2016-10-01 00:00:00 UTC | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Oct 2016 | 2016-10-01 00:00:00 UTC | 2016-11-01 00:00:00 UTC | 1 | 0 | 1 |
| Nov 2016 | 2016-11-01 00:00:00 UTC | 2016-12-01 00:00:00 UTC | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Dec 2016 | 2016-12-01 00:00:00 UTC | 2017-01-01 00:00:00 UTC | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Jan 2017 | 2017-01-01 00:00:00 UTC | 2017-02-01 00:00:00 UTC | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Feb 2017 | 2017-02-01 00:00:00 UTC | 2017-03-01 00:00:00 UTC | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Mar 2017 | 2017-03-01 00:00:00 UTC | 2017-04-01 00:00:00 UTC | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Apr 2017 | 2017-04-01 00:00:00 UTC | 2017-05-01 00:00:00 UTC | 1 | 0 | 1 |
| May 2017 | 2017-05-01 00:00:00 UTC | 2017-06-01 00:00:00 UTC | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Jun 2017 | 2017-06-01 00:00:00 UTC | 2017-07-01 00:00:00 UTC | 3 | 0 | 3 |
| Jul 2017 | 2017-07-01 00:00:00 UTC | 2017-08-01 00:00:00 UTC | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Aug 2017 | 2017-08-01 00:00:00 UTC | 2017-09-01 00:00:00 UTC | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Sep 2017 | 2017-09-01 00:00:00 UTC | 2017-10-01 00:00:00 UTC | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Oct 2017 | 2017-10-01 00:00:00 UTC | 2017-11-01 00:00:00 UTC | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Nov 2017 | 2017-11-01 00:00:00 UTC | 2017-12-01 00:00:00 UTC | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| Dec 2017 | 2017-12-01 00:00:00 UTC | 2018-01-01 00:00:00 UTC | 1 | 0 | 1 |
| Jan 2018 | 2018-01-01 00:00:00 UTC | 2018-02-01 00:00:00 UTC | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Feb 2018 | 2018-02-01 00:00:00 UTC | 2018-03-01 00:00:00 UTC | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Mar 2018 | 2018-03-01 00:00:00 UTC | 2018-04-01 00:00:00 UTC | 1 | 0 | 1 |
| Apr 2018 | 2018-04-01 00:00:00 UTC | 2018-05-01 00:00:00 UTC | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| May 2018 | 2018-05-01 00:00:00 UTC | 2018-06-01 00:00:00 UTC | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Jun 2018 | 2018-06-01 00:00:00 UTC | 2018-07-01 00:00:00 UTC | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Jul 2018 | 2018-07-01 00:00:00 UTC | 2018-08-01 00:00:00 UTC | 1 | 0 | 1 |
| Aug 2018 | 2018-08-01 00:00:00 UTC | 2018-09-01 00:00:00 UTC | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Sep 2018 | 2018-09-01 00:00:00 UTC | 2018-10-01 00:00:00 UTC | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Oct 2018 | 2018-10-01 00:00:00 UTC | 2018-11-01 00:00:00 UTC | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Nov 2018 | 2018-11-01 00:00:00 UTC | 2018-12-01 00:00:00 UTC | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Dec 2018 | 2018-12-01 00:00:00 UTC | 2019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC | 1 | 0 | 1 |
What Hacker News says
3 sourcesFound a nice write-up of these issues here for anyone else interested:
https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/issues/1001
TLS 1.3 0-RTT is not secure by default, but it is possible to provide both anti-replay and forward-secrecy properties for 0-RTT data with workarounds. As long as TLS 1.3 is not secure by default it is likely to lead to exploitable vulnerabilities that can only be fixed at the application level, distant from the cause. In general, it is also very challenging to fix applications to be idempotent and side-effect free.
Instead of shifting the problem to applications, we should strongly consider modifying the TLS 1.3 draft to make TLS 0-RTT secure by default, at least against replays. While Gillmor-style retry attacks will persist, these attacks may be mitigated with reasonable client behavior, and in many cases the existing c
Read the rest
lient behavior is already fault tolerant.
It's also a contested one as it can open one up to issues. Some of these are detailed here, for example: https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/issues/1001
It seems prudent to not support something like 0-RTT until the consequences of it are well understood and an informed decision can be made on if the increased speed is worth its trade-offs and how best to protect the data in transit from its potential issues.
In TLS 1.3 at Apple