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torvalds
linux
C2010–2026
torvalds / linux

linux

Linux kernel source tree

742Distinct people
940Mentions
5Explicit recommenders
255.5KGitHub stars
REPOSITORY AT A GLANCE

What to know before exploring

What it is

Linux kernel source tree

GitHub

Where it is used

  • Ubuntu — Ubuntu uses the Linux kernel at the core of the operating system to manage and control hardware resources like I/O, memory, and CPU. Source
  • Android — Android uses the upstream Linux LTS kernel as the base of its Android kernel. Google then adds Android-specific patches to produce Android Common Kernels. Source
  • 1 more documented example

What people are saying

For critical applications, I for one would like to know the story behind a commit, preferably in the commit itself and not a reference to an external system like idk, Jira. My…

Cthulhu_ used a recommendation phrase. 5 indexed comments match. This is a phrase match, not a verdict.

No classified warning is attached to this page. Read the discussions before treating silence as approval.

Also in these discussions

Mentioned in the same Hacker News threads. That is not proof they are substitutes.

This week on Hacker News

Nov 7–Nov 14 UTC · Direct repository links and separately labeled related project stories. Indexed through 11/14/2026, 7:56:55 PM UTC.

GitHub Down Again? direct repository linkCritical

Users report that GitHub's official status page inaccurately claims all systems are operational while widespread 504 gateway timeouts and download failures disrupt CI/CD pipelines and software distribution. The conversation highlights significant frustration with the platform's reliability and transparency, leading to debates about migrating to self-hosted or alternative services like Codeberg.

57 readable replies · Supporting reply 1 · Supporting reply 2 · Supporting reply 3 · Supporting reply 4

Mentions over time

HN mentions by year940 dated mentions

Observed mentions: 2010-07-15 18:39:05 UTC to 2026-10-29 13:46:22 UTC.

02550751002010-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2011-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 0 submissions, 1 comments20102011-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2012-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 13 mentions; 3 submissions, 10 comments2012-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2013-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 24 mentions; 2 submissions, 22 comments2013-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2014-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 23 mentions; 5 submissions, 18 comments2014-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2015-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 31 mentions; 7 submissions, 24 comments2015-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2016-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 42 mentions; 4 submissions, 38 comments2016-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2017-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 55 mentions; 9 submissions, 46 comments2017-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2018-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 72 mentions; 8 submissions, 64 comments2018-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 57 mentions; 8 submissions, 49 comments20182019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 66 mentions; 6 submissions, 60 comments2020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 80 mentions; 6 submissions, 74 comments2021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 91 mentions; 8 submissions, 83 comments2022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 104 mentions; 8 submissions, 96 comments2023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 76 mentions; 3 submissions, 73 comments2024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 76 mentions; 6 submissions, 70 comments2025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 72 mentions; 7 submissions, 65 comments2026-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2027-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 57 mentions; 8 submissions, 49 comments. Incomplete calendar period.2026*

* An incomplete calendar period is marked with an outlined bar. Its count is not directly comparable with a full period.

Counts come from the repository’s dated source evidence. Index cutoff: 2026-11-02 08:16:59 UTC.

View mention counts and date ranges
UTC ranges include their start and exclude their end. Select a period to filter the source evidence.
PeriodStart (UTC)End (exclusive, UTC)MentionsSubmissionsComments
20102010-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2011-01-01 00:00:00 UTC101
20112011-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2012-01-01 00:00:00 UTC13310
20122012-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2013-01-01 00:00:00 UTC24222
20132013-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2014-01-01 00:00:00 UTC23518
20142014-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2015-01-01 00:00:00 UTC31724
20152015-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2016-01-01 00:00:00 UTC42438
20162016-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2017-01-01 00:00:00 UTC55946
20172017-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2018-01-01 00:00:00 UTC72864
20182018-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC57849
20192019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC66660
20202020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC80674
20212021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC91883
20222022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC104896
20232023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC76373
20242024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC76670
20252025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2026-01-01 00:00:00 UTC72765
2026 (partial)2026-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2027-01-01 00:00:00 UTC57849

What Hacker News says

42 sources
Userspace networking to dodge kernelspace ping pong RTT overhead? This looks like it has the potential to be awesome. At the very least, it's a great quick talk on how "kernelspace/userspace RTTs are not fast mkaaaay?" and it's exciting that some folks are trying to think outside the box on this. So, questions: Am I correct in thinking this approach would be limited to advisory-only sorts of networking help, and cannot be used as a security boundary? It seems like anything running within a container's network namespace would still need a host interface exposed for its own virtualized packets, and obviously LD_PRELOAD hijinx remain freely ignorable by any program that decides not to go with the libc flow. Maybe it's possible to pick up the host interface, and then jump into the container's limited network namespace and thus be able to
Read the rest
give no other options to the other contained processes? Alternatively, I wonder if this approach could also be plugged in via seccomp filters, as well as LD_PRELOAD hooks? The docs at https://github.com/torvalds/linux/blob/5634347dee31373a8faf0... seem to suggest syscall capture and reroute might be capable of this. This would still be causing a kernel/userspace bounce, which we were trying to avoid, but it would still cut out the unnecessary trips through the host networking stack that we're going to ignore anyway... and more importantly, would actually be strong enough to be relied upon as a security constraint. Good luck, ZeroTier folks! Looking forward to watching this continue to develop.
In Introducing Network Containers
Agreed. The Linux kernel being a good example. See http://blog.regehr.org/archives/894 , http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.linux.kernel/84823/focus=85436 and https://github.com/torvalds/linux/search?q=goto for some discussion and examples. From Mr Torvalds (as diplomatic as ever...): >I think goto's are fine, and they are often more readable than large amounts of indentation. That's _especially_ true if the code flow isn't actually naturally indented (in this case it is, so I don't think using goto is in any way _clearer_ than not, but in general goto's can be quite good for readability). >Of course, in stupid languages like Pascal, where labels cannot be descriptive, goto's can be bad. But that's not the fault of the goto, that's the braindamage of the language designer.
In Goto in Python
There is, and it's been fixed in Linux for a few years, possibly the severity of the issue wasn't even realized back then. In linux-mainline/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S, at syscall_return you'll find a comment explaining that a more complicated and slower method will used to return to usespace should a few conditions not be met. https://github.com/torvalds/linux/blob/master/arch/x86/entry... The original fix is from 2006, then at x86_64/kernel/entry.S https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/7bf36bbc5e0c09271f9... [PATCH] x86_64: When user could have changed RIP always force IRET Intel EM64T CPUs handle uncanonical return addresses differently from AMD CPUs. The exception is reported in the SYSRET, not the next instruction. This leads to the kernel exception handler running on the user stack with the wrong GS becau
Read the rest
se the kernel didn't expect exceptions on this instruction. This version of the patch has the teething problems that plagued an earlier version fixed. This is CVE-2006-0744 Thanks to Ernie Petrides and Asit B. Mallick for analysis and initial patches.
In The Intel SYSRET privilege escalation (2012)
Is there something Im missing with pull requests? Or is it that even programmers like UIs? 1) Git log becomes useless. 2) You're merging code via a UI, without ANY granularity whatsoever. 3) Does it not just FEEL dirty doing this in a UI? 4) A little appeal to authority: http://www.wired.com/2012/05/torvalds_github/ 5) and a bit more: https://github.com/torvalds/linux/pull/17#issuecomment-56637... 6) Efficiency lost w regards to minor changes. Youd actually write a comment to have someone change something and then RE-issue the pull request? Sure you would, because youre middle management. Pull requests seem to be a hacky way for management to get involved with something they understand at the loss of control in arguably the most complex phase of coding: INTEGRATION.
In Ask HN: What is the best pre-commit code review workflow?

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