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trojan-gfw
trojan
C++2018–2023
trojan-gfw / trojan

trojan

An unidentifiable mechanism that helps you bypass GFW.

8Distinct people
8Mentions
0Explicit recommenders
19.7KGitHub stars
REPOSITORY AT A GLANCE

What to know before exploring

What it is

An unidentifiable mechanism that helps you bypass GFW.

GitHub

Where it is used

No documented product use has been verified yet.

What people are saying

No recommendation phrase was found in the indexed comments.

No classified warning is attached to this page. Read the discussions before treating silence as approval.

Also in these discussions

No other repository is repeatedly linked in the same discussions.

This week on Hacker News

Nov 7–Nov 14 UTC · Direct repository links and separately labeled related project stories. Indexed through 11/14/2026, 5:04:57 PM UTC.

No direct repository links were found in the indexed HN discussions over the past seven days. Older discussions are available below.

Mentions over time

HN mentions by year8 dated mentions

Observed mentions: 2018-10-19 03:02:47 UTC to 2023-10-06 01:46:06 UTC.

01232018-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 1 submissions, 0 comments20182019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 0 submissions, 1 comments2020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 3 mentions; 1 submissions, 2 comments20202021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 3 mentions; 0 submissions, 3 comments2023

Counts come from the repository’s dated source evidence. Index cutoff: 2026-11-02 08:16:59 UTC.

View mention counts and date ranges
UTC ranges include their start and exclude their end. Select a period to filter the source evidence.
PeriodStart (UTC)End (exclusive, UTC)MentionsSubmissionsComments
20182018-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC110
20192019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC101
20202020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC312
20212021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC000
20222022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC000
20232023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC303

What Hacker News says

8 sources
A fellow Aussie currently in China, a Trojan [0] server has been working fine for the last week I've been here. I've got it hosted through a VPS (smaller provider) in LA. While it's a bit of a pain to setup, reliability has been pretty decent (with occasional? short breaks) and definitely useable - my laptop is connected 24/7 and I can access the unfiltered web, including video, just fine. V2ray also supposedly works quite well, but I haven't looked into it. [0] https://github.com/trojan-gfw/trojan
In How the great firewall of China detects and blocks fully encrypted traffic [pdf]
This page has more details than the "executive summary" https://github.com/trojan-gfw/trojan/blob/master/docs/protoc... As far as I understand it: 1. Client connects to the standard HTTPS port. 2. If it provides a packet with the right (encrypted) password, then the server acts as a SOCKS5 proxy. 3. If it doesn't provide the right password, the server responds like a normal HTTP server over the TLS connection. Seems pretty clever, the hard bit is making sure the passwords don't leak and the firewall starts bombarding suspect servers with requests (brute-forcing passwords). Also if there are timing differences between a genuinely confused HTTP server and a "Trojan" server faking the confusion, they'd figure that out too. Also, things like continuous back-and-forth between the client and a simple webserver would be suspicious, because usual
Read the rest
ly clients send small requests in bursts, get the response, and activity would stop (it doesn't apply to streaming sites, obviously, but there the clients won't be as chatty either). So things like Skype calls might be easily recognized...
In An unidentifiable mechanism that helps bypass the Great Firewall of China
1. ShadowsocksR (SSR) is probably still the single most popular method for crossing the wall (翻墙), despite the fact that it is no longer maintained. 2. The original Shadowsocks (SS) is still maintained. Some users are reporting that the GFW can now detect and block SS servers that do not use some form of obfuscation. One interesting innovation is the Cloak plugin for Shadowsocks-Libev. This aims to disguise the SS server as an HTTPS server. 3. V2Ray offers more features and is less likely to be blocked than SS, though it is harder to configure. The graphical user interface (GUI) for V2Ray is provided by separate projects such as V2RayN for Windows and BifrostV for Android. 4. The trojan-gfw/trojan project on Github has been in development since October 2017. It claims to imitate HTTPS so well as to be undetectable. Configuration is slight
Read the rest
ly more complex than SS/SSR. https://github.com/trojan-gfw/trojan 5. The ValdikSS/GoodbyeDPI project on Github claims to be able to bypass deep packet inspection (DPI). https://github.com/ValdikSS/GoodbyeDPI 6. A few netizens use Tor with the meek-azure pluggable transport, though the Tor Browser is itself difficult to obtain in China. MY PROTIP: USE SNOWFLAKE instead of meek azure 7.Wireguard may still work, though its protocol could conceivably be detected and blocked by the GFW at some later date. NOW IS BANNED https://medium.com/@phoebecross/bypass-gfw-china-2019-9d293b...
In Ask HN: Best VPN for China as of August 2019

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