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tutao
tutanota
TypeScript2014–2026
tutao / tutanota

tutanota

Tuta is an email service with a strong focus on security and privacy that lets you encrypt emails, contacts and calendar entries on all your devices.

22Distinct people
22Mentions
0Explicit recommenders
8.2KGitHub stars
REPOSITORY AT A GLANCE

What to know before exploring

What it is

Tuta is an email service with a strong focus on security and privacy that lets you encrypt emails, contacts and calendar entries on all your devices.

GitHub

Where it is used

No documented product use was verified in the last source check.

What people are saying

No recommendation phrase was found in the indexed comments.

No classified warning is attached to this page. Read the discussions before treating silence as approval.

Also in these discussions

No other repository is repeatedly linked in the same discussions.

This week on Hacker News

Nov 7–Nov 14 UTC · Direct repository links and separately labeled related project stories. Indexed through 11/14/2026, 5:04:57 PM UTC.

No direct repository links were found in the indexed HN discussions over the past seven days. Older discussions are available below.

Mentions over time

HN mentions by year22 dated mentions

Observed mentions: 2014-10-29 08:43:47 UTC to 2026-04-25 15:22:49 UTC.

01232014-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2015-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 2 mentions; 1 submissions, 1 comments20142015-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2016-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 2 mentions; 0 submissions, 2 comments2016-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2017-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 1 submissions, 0 comments2017-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2018-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 0 submissions, 1 comments2018-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 3 mentions; 1 submissions, 2 comments2019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 0 submissions, 1 comments2020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments20202021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 3 mentions; 0 submissions, 3 comments2022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 3 mentions; 0 submissions, 3 comments2024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 3 mentions; 1 submissions, 2 comments2025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 2 mentions; 0 submissions, 2 comments2026-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2027-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 1 submissions, 0 comments. Incomplete calendar period.2026*

* An incomplete calendar period is marked with an outlined bar. Its count is not directly comparable with a full period.

Counts come from the repository’s dated source evidence. Index cutoff: 2026-11-02 08:16:59 UTC.

View mention counts and date ranges
UTC ranges include their start and exclude their end. Select a period to filter the source evidence.
PeriodStart (UTC)End (exclusive, UTC)MentionsSubmissionsComments
20142014-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2015-01-01 00:00:00 UTC211
20152015-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2016-01-01 00:00:00 UTC202
20162016-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2017-01-01 00:00:00 UTC110
20172017-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2018-01-01 00:00:00 UTC101
20182018-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC312
20192019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC101
20202020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC000
20212021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC303
20222022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC000
20232023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC303
20242024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC312
20252025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2026-01-01 00:00:00 UTC202
2026 (partial)2026-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2027-01-01 00:00:00 UTC110

What Hacker News says

22 sources
Last time I checked, while tutanota's emails are ostensibly E2E encrypted, all public keys are provided by their server and there's no way to pin keys or verify them over a side channel, so a compromised server could trivially send its own public keys and MITM attack all encrypted emails. This completely defeats the purpose and guarantees of E2E encryption, but for some reason, it hasn't seemed to be a priority for them. The article passingly mentions key verification, so hopefully that's changed. https://github.com/tutao/tutanota/issues/768
In Tuta Launches Post Quantum Cryptography for Email (2024)
Tangent: Been looking to switch email providers for a while, and hadn’t heard of Tuta. Looked good enough I just went ahead and signed up… only to find out apparently they provide no real data portability whatsoever. The only option for getting your email _out_ of their systems is to select small batches of them one-by-one in their app and export them. There have been many requests for something similar to Proton’s bridge functionality that haven’t gone anywhere. A more useful export function has been near the top of their public roadmap[0] for half a decade now it looks like.[1] Guess I’ll go find out what their refund process is like. Don’t mind me. Just yelling into the void. [0] https://tuta.com/roadmap/ [1] https://github.com/tutao/tutanota/issues/1292
In Proton Mail discloses user data leading to arrest in Spain
Tutanota·Mar 18, 2024Submission

Show HN: TutaCrypt, post-quantum encryption protocols for securing emails [pdf]

Hi HN, we are the developers from Tuta (formerly Tutanota), the German end-to-end encrypted email provider, and we recently released the world's first post-quantum encryption for email. We have included a full technical write-up of the cryptography involved in these changes and we have released it for open public review. This document specifies TutaCrypt, a protocol designed for hybrid email encryption in Tuta Mail. The protocol combines a classical Elliptic-Curve-Diffie-Hellman key exchange with a post-quantum KEM. The goal is to replace the usage of RSA in Tuta Mail. In the remainder of this document we describe some preliminaries such as the cryptographic primitives used. We define the core algorithms of the protocol and describe the flow of messages between the communicating parties. Finally, we discuss the security properties and som
Read the rest
e limitations of the protocol in its current form. We are eager for your constructive feedback. All cryptography related source code is available for review and experimenting here: https://github.com/tutao/tutanota/blob/master/src/api/worker... If you have any questions or comments related to post-quantum cryptography please let us know in the comments!
15 points · Open discussion
rich coming from tuta who still lack a onion based login. this ticket from 2018 was locked as off-topic. https://github.com/tutao/tutanota/issues/528 as lenin said, the best way to control the opposition is to lead it. for me, unless the company has been raided by the government they simply cannot be trusted. apple proudly advertises privacy on huge billboards while sharing everything they are asked under shadow laws. absolute hypocrisy and double standards. but then they wouldnt be where they are without government money and favours.
In Apple and Google Monitor Notifications. We Need Push Notification Alternatives
Tutanota likes to tell everyone that they are literally Signal in the email world in terms of security. But there is a known vulnerability in their "E2EE": https://github.com/tutao/tutanota/issues/768 There is no way to verify key fingerprint of your recipient right now. So server can just man-in-the-middle you providing third-party key and read all messages silently. It is not e2e encryption if you have to trust the server. Period.
In Tutanota is now Tuta
MySQL is a successful product that was sold to Sun / Oracle for a BILLION dollars. MariaDB and Percona Server are good examples of competing businesses produced from a commercially successful GPL opensource software (MySQL): - MariaDB: https://mariadb.com/products/community-server/ - Percona Server for MySQL: https://www.percona.com/software/mysql-database/percona-serv... Other additional examples of successfully commercialised xGPL products with different business models: - Red Hat Linux: https://sfconservancy.org/blog/2023/jun/23/rhel-gpl-analysis... - QT: https://www.qt.io/licensing/ - Ghostscript: https://www.ghostscript.com/licensing/index.html - WordPress: https://wordpress.com/ (based on https://wordpress.org/ ) - Buskill (hardware): https://www.buskill.in/ - Moodle: https://moodle.com/ (based on https://moodle.org/) - ProtonMail:
Read the rest
https://proton.me/mail (based on https://github.com/ProtonMail ) - Tutanota: https://tutanota.com/ (based on https://github.com/tutao/tutanota/ ) - Dada Mail: https://www.dadamailproject.com/ - Dietlibc: https://www.fefe.de/dietlibc/ The commercial success of a product totally depends on the business model you come up with, whatever be its opensource (or not) license. Corporates have a vested interest in promoting the propaganda that only a non-xGPL opensource license can be commercialised successfully simply because they cannot freely steal the source code of a competing xGPL licensed software. The real value of an FSF license, like the AGPL, is that it is designed to protect the copyright holders, and its users, "right to repair". And thus, it cannot be closed source by anyone (apart from the original copyright holders) once released under the said license (even if future versions are closed source, the old version under xGPL remain opensource perpetually). Other open source license (that are less stringent) are prioritised to increase developer contribution. Source code under such license can thus be closed-source even from the original copyright holder. But again, commercial success totally depends on the business model you come up with, irrespective of your license. The right license and the right business model will empower each other. Or cripple your business.
In HashiCorp adopts Business Source License
I'll bite. First, encryption is not "obscurity" in the same way you think DRM is. Second, several other email providers don't think they need to rely on some performance-killing DRM to "protect" their web app (oh no, what of all the value!). Outlook has a part of their files minified, but doesn't use any obfuscation; apps like ProtonMail[0] and Tutanota[1] are even open source. (I'm actually starting to migrate off of Gmail to Protonmail myself.) [0]: https://github.com/ProtonMail/proton-mail/ (the new site, on beta.protonmail.com) [1]: https://github.com/tutao/tutanota Oh, and there's no need to call people "communists", "attackers", or "criminal scum". Be civil.
In Mighty Makes Google Chrome Faster
> [citation needed] I don't have anything but own anecdotial evidence to provide. Would be cool if there were some good, recent benchmarks between the two, but I wasn't able to find any. Maybe I've just configured something wrong, but I keep facing this issue where autocomplete stops to think suggestions and might just freeze the whole VSCode for a second. This is in a small project that has some fairly large library definition files (namely, aws-sdk). If you search for "TypeScript performance", you'll find a bunch of issues and posts discussing the subject, so I don't think I'm totally alone in calling it out. Granted, Flow gets it's share of similar search results and I have also experienced similar issues where a recheck sometimes takes long and CPU usage jumps very high. This side of Flow has been consistently improving between almost
Read the rest
every release, though. Most recently, a couple months back, their switch to this new "types-first" architecture [1] is supposedly unlocking something like 50%-90% perf improvements compared to what they vere before. My point with this isn't to question your experience with Flow, I've sometimes faced similar issues. I'm just saying that, depending on the Flow version you were using, things may have changed a lot for the better. Just so that I'm not talking _completely_ out of my ass here, as a quick very unscientific test I cloned the Tutanota project's repo [2]. SCC says there's 967 JS files, consisting of 205433 lines of code in there. Flow version is 0.136, which is a little behind, but they are using the new types first mode. time node_modules/.bin/flow check Found 0 errors node_modules/.bin/flow check 1,00s user 0,11s system 9% cpu 11,905 total [1] https://medium.com/flow-type/types-first-a-scalable-new-arch... [2] https://github.com/tutao/tutanota
In Show HN: React Flow – library for creating node based editors and apps

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