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valimised
evalimine
Python2013–2017
valimised / evalimine · Archived

evalimine

e-hääletamise tarkvara

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15Distinct people
17Mentions
0Explicit recommenders
721GitHub stars
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e-hääletamise tarkvara

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This week on Hacker News

Nov 7–Nov 14 UTC · Direct repository links and separately labeled related project stories. Indexed through 11/14/2026, 3:03:16 PM UTC.

No direct repository links were found in the indexed HN discussions over the past seven days. Older discussions are available below.

Mentions over time

HN mentions by year17 dated mentions

Observed mentions: 2013-07-12 10:00:38 UTC to 2017-08-02 14:22:47 UTC.

0123452013-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2014-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 5 mentions; 1 submissions, 4 comments20132014-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2015-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 2 mentions; 0 submissions, 2 comments2015-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2016-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 3 mentions; 0 submissions, 3 comments20152016-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2017-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 5 mentions; 1 submissions, 4 comments2017-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2018-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 2 mentions; 0 submissions, 2 comments2017

Counts come from the repository’s dated source evidence. Index cutoff: 2026-11-02 08:16:59 UTC.

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PeriodStart (UTC)End (exclusive, UTC)MentionsSubmissionsComments
20132013-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2014-01-01 00:00:00 UTC514
20142014-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2015-01-01 00:00:00 UTC202
20152015-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2016-01-01 00:00:00 UTC303
20162016-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2017-01-01 00:00:00 UTC514
20172017-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2018-01-01 00:00:00 UTC202

What Hacker News says

17 sources
simpss·Aug 2, 2017
This has been solved, and it's really simple actually. I wrote about it in another comment, but I'll quickly go over the technology here as well. When a citizen votes, the vote is encrypted with the government public key. The vote is then put into a container and is signed with the citizens private key. The vote gets sent to the voting-system servers and is then stored until counting day. Once the voting period has ended the encrypted votes are pulled out of the signed containers and the signed containers themselves are destroyed, this anonymizes the votes. Only then are the encrypted votes decrypted with the government private key. We keep the signed containers around the encrypted vote to make sure no-one can be forced to e-vote. Every citizen can vote as many times as they want during the e-voting period and only the last vote counts.
Read the rest
So if someone is standing behind you and telling you to vote somehow, you can do as they say and just vote again afterwards. As an extra backup, if you do cast your vote on paper as well, then the paper vote is counted and the e-vote is discarded. The system has a prerequisite though, each citizen must have a private key. We do, as it's stored on our id-cards(equivalent to passports within the EU). Procedures are in place to protect the Government private key during the voting period and just like with paper-voting observers are involved in every step of the process. The English documentation is scarce, but the software itself is open source: https://github.com/vvk-ehk/evalimine
In Hacking Voting Machines at Defcon
simpss·Aug 2, 2017
Estonian reporting in. Our internet voting system has solved this problem. The votes secrecy is guaranteed by allowing citizens to vote multiple times and only the last vote is counted. No-one is obligated to vote on the internet and a paper system works in parallel. If you cast your vote on the internet AND with a paper ballot as well, the paper ballot is counted. This guarantees no-one can be forced to vote, as they can simply vote again in the 7 day e-voting period. Each vote is encrypted and signed, but in two different containers. The goverment public key is used to encrypt the vote. That container is then wrapped into another that is signed with the citizens private key. Before counting, the double-casts are filtered out and the votes are anonymized by removing the signed wrapper. And, it's open source: https://github.com/vvk-ehk/ev
Read the rest
alimine
In Hacking Voting Machines at Defcon
SanFranManDan·Dec 14, 2016
How they use the singleton is strange also. https://github.com/vvk-ehk/evalimine/blob/master/ivote-serve... > Election().count_questions() > Election().is_hes() > for el in Election().get_questions() > Election().is_voters_list_disabled() Election is a singleton so they keep reinstantiating it every time they want to use it instead of just doing > election = Election() at the module level and having a more idiomatic singleton (module variable are singletons). But a singleton design probably isn't the best approach. The singleton example isn't that bad of code since it assumes that one server will run one election which is a valid assumption, but reading through this code makes me weary about e-voting. I think this proves that OpenSource doesn't always mean good code. There is little incentive for people outside of Estonia to contribu
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te to the project.
In CHVote: Open-source e-voting system from Switzerland
catwell·Feb 16, 2014
Your 80 year old grandmother probably already doesn't verify that her vote conts at every step. Once you have placed the ballot in a box, you have to be there in the evening to actually count the ballots. And then you have to check that at every step until the final result is obtained the sums are computed correctly. The easiest way to cheat (efficiently) at an election is certainly not to fake individual votes. There has been a lot of FUD on e-voting, mostly as a reaction to the use of very bad, proprietary, unverified technology for that purpose. There are good e-voting systems coming up, like the one used in Estonia (https://github.com/vvk-ehk/evalimine) or Helios (https://vote.heliosvoting.org/, presentation: http://schedule2012.rmll.info/IMG/pdf/slides.pdf). Those probably shouldn't be used for the most important elections, but they
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are already way more secure than, say, vote-by-mail.
In The Insecurity of Secret IT Systems
rudolfosman·Jan 27, 2014
I'm an Estonian and have been enjoying all these benefits for many years already. Can't really imagine a life without them :) Here are my replies to your questions: * The mobile company does not have access to your data. They just issue a special SIM card that stores your private keys. Unlike the article states, there is actually also a small piece of software installed on your phone that is later used for authentication and signing. The way it works is that you go to a site where you want to log in (I'll use Estonian government portal https://www.eesti.ee/eng/ as an example here), you press Enter (or "Log in" or whatever the button is called on the site) and choose "Login with mobile-ID". In Estonian government portal both your phone number and personal code are asked as "usernames" but some sites might ask either one of them (depends on
Read the rest
the site's owner). Then after a few seconds your phone will display a screen showing that a connection is being made. At the same time you will be shown a "control code" on the browser screen that you will have to confirm on your phone. This is done in order to prevent some forms of man-in-the-middle attacks. Then you're prompted to enter a mobile ID PIN1 code (used for authentication) into the phone. If PIN1 is correct, the screen on the phone disappears and the website is automatically reloaded with a logged in screen. You can cancel the authentication procedure at any moment. PIN2 is used for signing and works the same. * Obviously it would take a lot of time to answer all the problems posed in the Wikipedia. I would disagree, however, that Estonian e-elections are easy to tamper. As Estonia is on the forefront of e-voting in the world, all these problems are addressed and analysed in great detail by our Electronic Voting Committee (http://vvk.ee/general-info/electronic-voting-committee/) that is involving leading e-voting experts in their work. There have been many debates about e-voting and rulings by our Supreme Court. The process of e-voting is very transparent (you can start reading about it here: http://vvk.ee/voting-methods-in-estonia/engindex/), it's heavily audited before, during and after the voting, the software is open-sourced (https://github.com/vvk-ehk/evalimine) and very well documented. But to give a very high-level answer to your question about recounting the votes - there are many different applications and servers used in the e-voting process that keep traceable logs. If recounting is needed then these log files are used in order to determine if votes were tampered in some constituency.
In An Estonian shares his country's strategy for navigating the digital world
michael_nielsen·Aug 29, 2013
Online voting has been used on a significant scale in several places, including Estonia, Gujarat, and some cantons in Switzerland. I'm not an expert on how well (or poorly) these experiments have gone, but the following article contains a lot of useful information and pointers: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Electronic_voting_examples Estonia was apparently the first country to allow internet voting in a general election. Participation has grown rapidly, with roughly a quarter of votes in the last parliamentary election being cast online: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Electronic_voting_in_Estonia This suggests that a large fraction of the population are unlikely to care about the theoretical considerations that are dominating the discussion elsewhere in this thread. Voting by mobile phone is also now legal in Estonia. The latest Python s
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ource code for the servers in the Estonian voting system is available on GitHub: https://github.com/vvk-ehk/evalimine Incidentally, I got a smile out of the sampling bias inherent in this poll! It would have been even funnier if the question was "Would you ever take part in an online poll?"
In Poll: Would you vote online if you could?

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