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valimised
evalimine
Python2013–2017
valimised / evalimine · Archived

evalimine

e-hääletamise tarkvara

15Distinct people
17Mentions
0Explicit recommenders
721GitHub stars
REPOSITORY AT A GLANCE

What to know before exploring

What it is

e-hääletamise tarkvara

GitHub

Where it is used

No documented product use was verified in the last source check.

What people are saying

No recommendation phrase was found in the indexed comments.

No classified warning is attached to this page. Read the discussions before treating silence as approval.

Also in these discussions

No other repository is repeatedly linked in the same discussions.

This week on Hacker News

Nov 8–Nov 15 UTC · Direct repository links and separately labeled related project stories. Indexed through 11/15/2026, 5:03:38 AM UTC.

No direct repository links were found in the indexed HN discussions over the past seven days. Older discussions are available below.

Mentions over time

HN mentions by year17 dated mentions

Observed mentions: 2013-07-12 10:00:38 UTC to 2017-08-02 14:22:47 UTC.

0123452013-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2014-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 5 mentions; 1 submissions, 4 comments20132014-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2015-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 2 mentions; 0 submissions, 2 comments2015-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2016-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 3 mentions; 0 submissions, 3 comments20152016-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2017-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 5 mentions; 1 submissions, 4 comments2017-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2018-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 2 mentions; 0 submissions, 2 comments2017

Counts come from the repository’s dated source evidence. Index cutoff: 2026-11-02 08:16:59 UTC.

View mention counts and date ranges
UTC ranges include their start and exclude their end. Select a period to filter the source evidence.
PeriodStart (UTC)End (exclusive, UTC)MentionsSubmissionsComments
20132013-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2014-01-01 00:00:00 UTC514
20142014-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2015-01-01 00:00:00 UTC202
20152015-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2016-01-01 00:00:00 UTC303
20162016-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2017-01-01 00:00:00 UTC514
20172017-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2018-01-01 00:00:00 UTC202

What Hacker News says

2 sources
This has been solved, and it's really simple actually. I wrote about it in another comment, but I'll quickly go over the technology here as well. When a citizen votes, the vote is encrypted with the government public key. The vote is then put into a container and is signed with the citizens private key. The vote gets sent to the voting-system servers and is then stored until counting day. Once the voting period has ended the encrypted votes are pulled out of the signed containers and the signed containers themselves are destroyed, this anonymizes the votes. Only then are the encrypted votes decrypted with the government private key. We keep the signed containers around the encrypted vote to make sure no-one can be forced to e-vote. Every citizen can vote as many times as they want during the e-voting period and only the last vote counts.
Read the rest
So if someone is standing behind you and telling you to vote somehow, you can do as they say and just vote again afterwards. As an extra backup, if you do cast your vote on paper as well, then the paper vote is counted and the e-vote is discarded. The system has a prerequisite though, each citizen must have a private key. We do, as it's stored on our id-cards(equivalent to passports within the EU). Procedures are in place to protect the Government private key during the voting period and just like with paper-voting observers are involved in every step of the process. The English documentation is scarce, but the software itself is open source: https://github.com/vvk-ehk/evalimine
In Hacking Voting Machines at Defcon
Estonian reporting in. Our internet voting system has solved this problem. The votes secrecy is guaranteed by allowing citizens to vote multiple times and only the last vote is counted. No-one is obligated to vote on the internet and a paper system works in parallel. If you cast your vote on the internet AND with a paper ballot as well, the paper ballot is counted. This guarantees no-one can be forced to vote, as they can simply vote again in the 7 day e-voting period. Each vote is encrypted and signed, but in two different containers. The goverment public key is used to encrypt the vote. That container is then wrapped into another that is signed with the citizens private key. Before counting, the double-casts are filtered out and the votes are anonymized by removing the signed wrapper. And, it's open source: https://github.com/vvk-ehk/ev
Read the rest
In Hacking Voting Machines at Defcon

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