vpnetd-sgx

You might find this helpful: https://youtu.be/sz7NAe0G1_Y?si=focPEWli8xv7NCDi Re verifiability: the point isn’t trust us, it’s that you don’t have to. We built it so anyone can independently confirm what’s running. 1. All server and client code is published. 2. Builds are reproducible. 3. Each node provides cryptographic attestations of its runtime and routing identity. 4. Enclaves are used for verifiable isolation. You can peruse the code yourself to see exactly why the transparency we bring makes legacy “trust based” VPNs obsolete: https://github.com/vpdotnet/vpnetd-sgx

You do need to trust Intel as it relates to deterministic and verifiable SGX hardware. SGX has had issues, but these are fixed pretty quickly [1]. Creating the isolated layer like SGX gives you verification of what is running on VP.NET's servers though, and the code is available to review and compile yourself so you can verify it is the same [2]. From a defense in depth standpoint, the more layered and isolated securities, the better. [1] https://sgx.fail [2] https://github.com/vpdotnet/vpnetd-sgx

VP.NET is the first VPN provider that you don't have to trust, but instead, can verify directly. See the source, which is verifiable: https://github.com/vpdotnet/vpnetd-sgx You can learn more here: https://vp.net/l/en-US/blog/Don%27t-Trust-Verify

Taking a look at their code I see a rather concerning comment: func (om *ObfuscationManager) ProcessOutgoingPacket( ... // TODO where is the obfuscation here? https://github.com/vpdotnet/vpnetd-sgx/blob/bc63e3b8efe41120... While I do see the impl of the 10ms flush interval, I don't see any randomisation within batches. So iiuc, packets are still flushed in their original order.

> No trust required. You also have to trust that SGX isn't compromised. But even without that, you can log what goes into SGX and what comes out of SGX. That seems pretty important, given that the packets flowing in and out need to be internet-routable and necessarily have IP headers. Their ISP could log the traffic, even if they don't. > Packet Buffering and Timing Protection: A 10ms flush interval batches packets together for temporal obfuscation That's something, I guess. I don't think 10ms worth of timing obfuscation gets you very much though. > This temporal obfuscation prevents timing correlation attacks This is a false statement. It makes correlation harder but correlation is a statistical relationship. The correlations are still there. (latter quotes are from their github readme https://github.com/vpdotnet/vpnetd-sgx ) All that sa

This is the repository for the Zero Trust VPN code run by VP.NET that allows you to verify that the servers are running the same code as the repository using Intel SGX for hardware guarantees.