aisi-mythos-inc-2026-07-28-01-recovered-pr

Actual details on the incident: https://github.com/w1b/aisi-mythos-inc-2026-07-28-01-recover... Both the attacker and the target account are very similar and look fake/bots.

Here’s the original PR: https:/github.com/w1b/aisi-mythos-inc-2026-07-28-01-recovered-pr It’s not great social engineering. The AI is immediately caught with malware and then tries to build social proof to get out of the issue? I think that social engineering is still for humans. I’m not sure how GitHub accounts agreeing with each other that I’ve never seen before would result in my merging a PR without at least looking for malware. Also code review agents should really not be fooled by invisible text tricks, I would hope so at least. The bar is very low for agent harnesses right now.

I found the original PR (thanks codex) and uh... IMO it's pretty underwhelming. https:/github.com/w1b/aisi-mythos-inc-2026-07-28-01-recovered-pr Turns out out of the 3 payloads (in this PR), the 1st and 3rd used a local IP (10.100.0.235:8000) as the C2 server, so they would have never worked. I haven't recovered the 2nd payload yet. This is amongst other silly stuff like 4 byte XOR keys for obfuscation and just blatantly disabling Electron sandboxing stuff without a good explanation. Looking at the victim repos, it's kinda hard to see why Mythos would target this guy. AISI describes a coincidental email domain in DNS cache, which now we know is zohomail.com; that's not a very unique domain. I suppose we don't know it's original CTF task, but seems like another HuggingFace incident where the model makes very poor (broad?) judgements about