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zerotier
libzt
C++2016–2020
zerotier / libzt

libzt

Encrypted P2P sockets over ZeroTier

4Distinct people
4Mentions
0Explicit recommenders
278GitHub stars
REPOSITORY AT A GLANCE

What to know before exploring

What it is

Encrypted P2P sockets over ZeroTier

GitHub

Where it is used

No documented product use has been verified yet.

What people are saying

No recommendation phrase was found in the indexed comments.

No classified warning is attached to this page. Read the discussions before treating silence as approval.

Also in these discussions

No other repository is repeatedly linked in the same discussions.

This week on Hacker News

Nov 7–Nov 14 UTC · Direct repository links and separately labeled related project stories. Indexed through 11/14/2026, 1:49:46 PM UTC.

No direct repository links were found in the indexed HN discussions over the past seven days. Older discussions are available below.

Mentions over time

HN mentions by year4 dated mentions

Observed mentions: 2016-07-24 06:25:30 UTC to 2020-01-30 05:01:59 UTC.

0122016-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2017-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 2 mentions; 1 submissions, 1 comments20162017-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2018-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2018-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 0 submissions, 1 comments20182019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 0 submissions, 1 comments2020

Counts come from the repository’s dated source evidence. Index cutoff: 2026-11-02 08:16:59 UTC.

View mention counts and date ranges
UTC ranges include their start and exclude their end. Select a period to filter the source evidence.
PeriodStart (UTC)End (exclusive, UTC)MentionsSubmissionsComments
20162016-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2017-01-01 00:00:00 UTC211
20172017-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2018-01-01 00:00:00 UTC000
20182018-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC101
20192019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC000
20202020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC101

What Hacker News says

4 sources
We built ZeroTier initially for this use case, and though it's now maturing into something more powerful (SDN type features) it's still very useful for this and the WAN use case is not going away. https://www.zerotier.com/ https://github.com/zerotier/ZeroTierOne https://github.com/zerotier/ZeroTierSDK The difference between something like ZeroTier and Tor is a trade-off between meta-data privacy and latency/speed. (Both encrypt the actual payload.) Efficient connectivity and anonymity are antagonistic goals. You can't provide both since optimization for one of these two goals implies violation of the other. Tor provides meta-data privacy, but it's impossible to do this without sacrificing a lot of performance. If you allow low latency on a privacy network, latency can be used to triangulate the endpoint. Rule of thumb: latency can never b
Read the rest
e lower than about 1/2 the time it takes a photon to travel the Earth's diameter. In practice it's higher since you must also account for median router latency. Same goes for high throughput though in that case you need much more detailed intel on the physical network. Rule of thumb here: if throughput is higher than global mean it can be used to rule out and thus narrow down paths in the graph. ZeroTier provides fast efficient low-latency direct connectivity but to do this requires that it introduce people directly, thus revealing peoples' locations (IP-wise) to each other. This is a hard requirement since the most efficient path is by definition the most direct and therefore de-anonymized (again IP-wise) path. You can't go directly A<>B without A knowing where B is and vice versa. Edit: I speak a bit theoretically above. In practice a weaker anonymity system could be deployed closer to the last mile to hide people at e.g. city resolution. But AFIAK this is not what Tor does, would probably require either a huge critical mass or last-mile carrier participation or both, and would still have a performance impact.
In Can NAT traversal be Tor's killer feature? (2014)

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