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signalapp
Signal-Android
Kotlin2011–2026
signalapp / Signal-Android

Signal-Android

A private messenger for Android.

280Distinct people
372Mentions
5Explicit recommenders
29.6KGitHub stars
REPOSITORY AT A GLANCE

What to know before exploring

What it is

A private messenger for Android.

GitHub

Where it is used

  • Molly — Molly uses the signalapp/signal-android codebase as an independent fork to deliver a variant of the Signal Android app with added features. It ships as its own app built from the Signal Android project. Source

What people are saying

I never hated on Signal, on the contrary I recommend it too many people but I can say that the energy consumption on Android is in many cases abysmal for multiple years now and…

johschmitz used a recommendation phrase. 5 indexed comments match. This is a phrase match, not a verdict.

No classified warning is attached to this page. Read the discussions before treating silence as approval.

Also in these discussions

Mentioned in the same Hacker News threads. That is not proof they are substitutes.

This week on Hacker News

Nov 9–Nov 16 UTC · Direct repository links and separately labeled related project stories. Indexed through 11/16/2026, 3:59:04 AM UTC.

No direct repository links were found in the indexed HN discussions over the past seven days. Older discussions are available below.

Mentions over time

HN mentions by year372 dated mentions

Observed mentions: 2011-12-21 12:48:31 UTC to 2026-10-12 11:10:46 UTC.

0204060802011-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2012-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 1 submissions, 0 comments20112012-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2013-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 4 mentions; 1 submissions, 3 comments2013-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2014-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 12 mentions; 0 submissions, 12 comments2014-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2015-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 23 mentions; 0 submissions, 23 comments2015-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2016-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 26 mentions; 1 submissions, 25 comments2016-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2017-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 46 mentions; 1 submissions, 45 comments2017-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2018-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 22 mentions; 2 submissions, 20 comments2018-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 24 mentions; 4 submissions, 20 comments20182019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 10 mentions; 1 submissions, 9 comments2020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 25 mentions; 1 submissions, 24 comments2021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 87 mentions; 12 submissions, 75 comments2022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 30 mentions; 2 submissions, 28 comments2023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 13 mentions; 0 submissions, 13 comments2024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 16 mentions; 2 submissions, 14 comments2025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 23 mentions; 1 submissions, 22 comments2026-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2027-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 10 mentions; 0 submissions, 10 comments. Incomplete calendar period.2026*

* An incomplete calendar period is marked with an outlined bar. Its count is not directly comparable with a full period.

Counts come from the repository’s dated source evidence. Index cutoff: 2026-11-02 08:16:59 UTC.

View mention counts and date ranges
UTC ranges include their start and exclude their end. Select a period to filter the source evidence.
PeriodStart (UTC)End (exclusive, UTC)MentionsSubmissionsComments
20112011-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2012-01-01 00:00:00 UTC110
20122012-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2013-01-01 00:00:00 UTC413
20132013-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2014-01-01 00:00:00 UTC12012
20142014-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2015-01-01 00:00:00 UTC23023
20152015-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2016-01-01 00:00:00 UTC26125
20162016-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2017-01-01 00:00:00 UTC46145
20172017-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2018-01-01 00:00:00 UTC22220
20182018-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC24420
20192019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC1019
20202020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC25124
20212021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC871275
20222022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC30228
20232023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC13013
20242024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC16214
20252025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2026-01-01 00:00:00 UTC23122
2026 (partial)2026-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2027-01-01 00:00:00 UTC10010

What Hacker News says

30 sources
Your "major problems" are fair, but nothing's perfect, so unless you have a better solution with the same design constraints (e.g. https://github.com/signalapp/Signal-Android/blob/main/CONTRI...), they are rather moot, because they're not actionable. That being said: > - it is not that private after all since it requires a phone number. Yes, you can override this by using some virtual throwaway number if you are geeky enough but your account will be associated with this phone number anyways. You still leak very little because of their sealed sender feature. If you allow arbitrary usernames, you need to bootstrap your trusted channel from no assumption instead of a weak one (if I receive a message from @barack_obama for the first time, I have no clue if it's actually someone I know, while a message from @+1235312 indicates that the sender
Read the rest
at least had access to this number at some point to register). All solutions have tradeoffs. > - as a consequence you _will_ receive spam from bots fanning out messages to phone numbers. There's very little spam now on Signal (I think I've had 2 spam messages in about 4 years). At one point there was a bit, but server-side measures are now preventing that. You can't really have no spam at all as long as you have a common id that's shared among your contacts, which is the case most of the time for usability, as any of these contacts can leak this id somehow. > - Signal protocol is probably great from the e2ee perspective but it is not federated and unlike XMPP you cannot spin up your own server and have full control over it. Signal's approach is that you shouldn't care about the server. Why do you? > And I am sure you cannot run an end-to-end audit of the whole Signal platform to verify that what they actually run has been built from the source code you have audited. You can do that on the client code, which is reproducible, and again mostly what you should care about. > - Since it is centralized, Signal is prone to censorship in those countries that decide to fight it. I'd say that their reliance on phone numbers is the main issue with censorship: if new users can't receive their registration text message, they cannot register. AFAICT people in censored countries still rely on WhatsApp, Signal and similar messengers instead of more niche but more decentralized alternatives like Tox. Again, however bad their current approach might be, it's a moot point until there's something that works better in practice.
In Signal says it won’t compromise on encryption
Correction. ONLY the contacts WITHIN Signal contact address book is used. Signal contact address book is wholly kept separate from your phone OS contact address book, even when you say yes to permission to share the OS contact address book. If you say no to the sharing of contact, then ONLY those contacts created WITHIN Signal’s own contact address book would have each Signal contact’s phone number as numerically big-hashed (within your own phone), then only those hash value of your limited Signal contact address book would be (naturally) sent to Signal server. This is why I said “if you don’t mind the obtuse associativity”. And that is OK for most OpSec. What is most important here is whatever you typed, only that other contact’s phone would be able to see this, no place else. That is, until the adversary gets their hand on one of the
Read the rest
phone before its timed message deletion period. This is all in the source code here https://github.com/signalapp/Signal-Android
In Signal TLS Proxy
All of your answers are in the links I provided, I'm more than happy to help, but please make an effort too. Here is the data that gets collected and stored in the cloud: https://github.com/signalapp/Signal-Android/blob/3553a28683d... > It also doesn't store any lists of who you contact; this claim is false. The entire point of Signal adding pins was to protect the data Signal now stores so that you can recover it. That includes: your contacts, profile, and settings. Signal is required to store your contacts in order for that to happen. Signal does not even try to deny that they collect and store your contacts. They just don't say so plainly and they often present the fact in misleading ways. Here's one example of them explaining their reasoning for storing your contacts on their servers: "We're trying to add support for identifiers that
Read the rest
aren't phone numbers, since that's what we've heard from users. If we do that, your signal contacts can't live in your address book anymore. Every other app just stores that in plaintext on their servers, which we don't want to do." [source](https://twitter.com/moxie/status/1277737851107471360?s=20) > You linked to a repository that uses Intel SGX which is used in this instance specifically to address your false claim that the e2e encryption used is easily bruteforced. It doesn't "address my false claim" it supports it. Again, please read the links. Especially https://community.signalusers.org/t/proper-secure-value-secu... since it addresses both the brute force issue, and why SGX is not able to protect the data. You might find https://community.signalusers.org/t/sgx-cacheout-sgaxe-attac... helpful as well.
In Twilio incident: What Signal users need to know

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