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signalapp
Signal-Android
Kotlin2011–2026
signalapp / Signal-Android

Signal-Android

A private messenger for Android.

280Distinct people
372Mentions
5Explicit recommenders
29.6KGitHub stars
REPOSITORY AT A GLANCE

What to know before exploring

What it is

A private messenger for Android.

GitHub

Where it is used

  • Molly — Molly uses the signalapp/signal-android codebase as an independent fork to deliver a variant of the Signal Android app with added features. It ships as its own app built from the Signal Android project. Source

What people are saying

I never hated on Signal, on the contrary I recommend it too many people but I can say that the energy consumption on Android is in many cases abysmal for multiple years now and…

johschmitz used a recommendation phrase. 5 indexed comments match. This is a phrase match, not a verdict.

No classified warning is attached to this page. Read the discussions before treating silence as approval.

Also in these discussions

Mentioned in the same Hacker News threads. That is not proof they are substitutes.

This week on Hacker News

Nov 9–Nov 16 UTC · Direct repository links and separately labeled related project stories. Indexed through 11/16/2026, 1:56:48 AM UTC.

No direct repository links were found in the indexed HN discussions over the past seven days. Older discussions are available below.

Mentions over time

HN mentions by year372 dated mentions

Observed mentions: 2011-12-21 12:48:31 UTC to 2026-10-12 11:10:46 UTC.

0204060802011-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2012-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 1 submissions, 0 comments20112012-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2013-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 4 mentions; 1 submissions, 3 comments2013-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2014-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 12 mentions; 0 submissions, 12 comments2014-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2015-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 23 mentions; 0 submissions, 23 comments2015-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2016-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 26 mentions; 1 submissions, 25 comments2016-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2017-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 46 mentions; 1 submissions, 45 comments2017-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2018-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 22 mentions; 2 submissions, 20 comments2018-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 24 mentions; 4 submissions, 20 comments20182019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 10 mentions; 1 submissions, 9 comments2020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 25 mentions; 1 submissions, 24 comments2021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 87 mentions; 12 submissions, 75 comments2022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 30 mentions; 2 submissions, 28 comments2023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 13 mentions; 0 submissions, 13 comments2024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 16 mentions; 2 submissions, 14 comments2025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 23 mentions; 1 submissions, 22 comments2026-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2027-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 10 mentions; 0 submissions, 10 comments. Incomplete calendar period.2026*

* An incomplete calendar period is marked with an outlined bar. Its count is not directly comparable with a full period.

Counts come from the repository’s dated source evidence. Index cutoff: 2026-11-02 08:16:59 UTC.

View mention counts and date ranges
UTC ranges include their start and exclude their end. Select a period to filter the source evidence.
PeriodStart (UTC)End (exclusive, UTC)MentionsSubmissionsComments
20112011-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2012-01-01 00:00:00 UTC110
20122012-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2013-01-01 00:00:00 UTC413
20132013-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2014-01-01 00:00:00 UTC12012
20142014-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2015-01-01 00:00:00 UTC23023
20152015-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2016-01-01 00:00:00 UTC26125
20162016-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2017-01-01 00:00:00 UTC46145
20172017-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2018-01-01 00:00:00 UTC22220
20182018-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC24420
20192019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC1019
20202020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC25124
20212021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC871275
20222022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC30228
20232023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC13013
20242024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC16214
20252025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2026-01-01 00:00:00 UTC23122
2026 (partial)2026-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2027-01-01 00:00:00 UTC10010

What Hacker News says

13 sources
Fortunately, they did foresee this! The push notification only contains enough information to tell the phone that it should fetch the actual notification content from Signal's servers. Here's a Signal dev talking about it on the Signal-Android GitHub: https://github.com/signalapp/Signal-Android/issues/12961#iss... And similarly for Signal-iOS: https://github.com/signalapp/Signal-iOS/issues/962#issuecomm...
In Governments spying on Apple, Google users through push notifications
Nope. "If Alice registers number X and enables reglock, but Bob later proves ownership of number X (by registering and completing the SMS code), then Alice will be unregistered." IE, if somone intercepts the SMS code, even with reglock, you can forcibly de-register somone. This means if you use loose access to your phone number, you can easily loose access to your signal account. https://github.com/signalapp/Signal-Android/issues/12595#iss... They justify this by saying "The intention of reglock is to prevent hijacking of numbers you actually own, not to guarantee the number for yourself for life", but its way to easy for activists and dissidents to lose ownership (temperately or permanently) of phone numbers for the phone number system to be the backbone identity system for a secure messaging platform
In Signal commit Username Integration Test
> To put this in context: if this bug does affect Android, then it could potentially be turned into a remote exploit for apps like Signal and WhatsApp. I'd expect it to be fixed in the October bulletin. Interesting quote from Ben Hawkes (former Project Zero manager) in the article. I regularly compile Signal-Android from source and happened to notice they vendored libwebp a few days ago: https://github.com/signalapp/Signal-Android/commit/a7d9fd19d...
In Google assigns a CVE for libwebp and gives it a 10.0 score
It's easy to say "just use a suitable encoding". But when people say "use AES-CBC + HMAC" and cite Signal as an example, and Signal's implementation does this: https://github.com/signalapp/Signal-Android/blob/main/app/sr... Well, when that happens, I feel the need to pipe in :) If you're careful enough to not implement a naive protocol that stitches AES+CBC and HMAC-SHA2 together (or, as tptacek put it in a podcast episode, throw some crypto potions into a cauldron and see what happens), you're probably the minority of crypto-savvy people.
In I want XAES-256-GCM/11
> I am sure you are not genuinely claiming that it's impossible for them to be influenced by PR firms or external marketing spend? That you sincerely believe they are never influenced by external marketing of people? How might you suppose they find people to write profiles on? I personally know that it isn't chance. "PR people pitch profiles to writers" is very different from...oh, what did you write? "From everything I personally know about the media, articles like that are usually paid for..." The former is normal journalism. The latter is an ethical breach. So, yes, let's talk about tone for a moment: in your post, you accused multiple people of ethical or legal breaches, on the basis of, oh...your feelings? Very respectful of you! Yes, my "tone" is direct. But I didn't accuse you of anything unethical, did I? > I do use my real name f
Read the rest
or whatever it's worth, I have absolutely no problem wearing these statements on my sleeve Hahah, OK then. > I'm really happy you took the the time to respond to me though Oh, but I did. As far as I can tell, you made one, and only one, technical claim: that Signal's reproducible builds aren't useful because they don't cover the NDK code. I asked you, twice now, "As I said, in which codebase does the key verification and encryption live--is it in the native code, or in the Java code? I suspect you don't know, or you don't know why that matters." You have twice now failed to reply to that. Care to try for a third time? Edit: Seems like Signal's reproducible builds now do cover native code, though I haven't tried this myself: https://github.com/signalapp/Signal-Android/blob/main/reprod.... So, like...what was your point again? Other than that you don't know what you're talking about?
In I don't trust Signal

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