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WICG
turtledove
Bikeshed2020–2023
WICG / turtledove · Archived

turtledove

TURTLEDOVE

18Distinct people
39Mentions
0Explicit recommenders
588GitHub stars
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TURTLEDOVE

GitHub

Where it is used

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Also in these discussions

Mentioned in the same Hacker News threads. That is not proof they are substitutes.

This week on Hacker News

Nov 7–Nov 14 UTC · Direct repository links and separately labeled related project stories. Indexed through 11/14/2026, 5:04:57 PM UTC.

No direct repository links were found in the indexed HN discussions over the past seven days. Older discussions are available below.

Mentions over time

HN mentions by year39 dated mentions

Observed mentions: 2020-03-25 01:04:40 UTC to 2023-10-30 21:42:16 UTC.

05101520252020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 8 mentions; 2 submissions, 6 comments20202021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 25 mentions; 0 submissions, 25 comments20212022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 6 mentions; 1 submissions, 5 comments2023

Counts come from the repository’s dated source evidence. Index cutoff: 2026-11-02 08:16:59 UTC.

View mention counts and date ranges
UTC ranges include their start and exclude their end. Select a period to filter the source evidence.
PeriodStart (UTC)End (exclusive, UTC)MentionsSubmissionsComments
20202020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC826
20212021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC25025
20222022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC000
20232023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC615

What Hacker News says

39 sources
It'll be interesting to see how this goes. Google and Mozilla+Meta each have competing standards. https://github.com/WICG/turtledove https://blog.mozilla.org/en/mozilla/privacy-preserving-attri... To my knowledge, Mozilla's design is the only one where someone other than the browser collects & reports on click activity, and with a fairly trustless anonymizing double blind strategy for those intermediaries.
In iOS 17 automatically removes tracking parameters from links you click on
That's the general idea. We're trying to limit the amount of abuse a single Google Account, device, or other first-party identity can cause. We have some more ideas and details we hope to share over time, but the goal is to keep writes to the API anonymous while preventing, the best we can, sybil attacks. We're willing to ignore/sacrifice some writes to achieve this (since any writes above ~k recent ones don't contribute directly to the utility of the system). Beyond Private State Tokens we also have new cryptography we're researching that should let us improve unlinkability between issuance and redemption further. https://github.com/WICG/turtledove/blob/main/FLEDGE_k_anonym... https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/320
In Partnering with Fastly–Oblivious HTTP relay for FLEDGE's 𝑘-anonymity server
You bring up an excellent point, and it’s something we really should discuss in our explainer: https://github.com/WICG/turtledove/blob/main/FLEDGE_k_anonym... We’ve been calling this problem key consistency, basically the risk that Google (or any OHTTP gateway operator) gives out unique keys to different users and builds a {user -> request} mapping based on the keys used to encrypt requests. The OHTTP authors published a draft spec discussing exactly this problem. https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-privacypass-key-... Frankly, none of the technical solutions we considered were satisfying enough given the added complexity. It’s actually kind of tricky to form a convincing distribution model. The designs we looked at mostly involve multi-party schemes where there’s trust required either that parties don’t collude with each other
Read the rest
or between the user and one party explicitly. Admittedly OHTTP is also premised on multiple parties not colluding, but we decided to punt on the key consistency problem for the sake of simplicity. We also recognize that it’s possible for savvy users to fetch the keys from the endpoints we’re serving them on, compare those keys with other users, and fact check our claims. We honestly have nothing to hide about this; everyone is receiving the same key. To specifically address the two proposals you made: 1) Shipping the key with the client: it’s not clear this is any better than fetching it right from Google. Chrome updates and our experiment framework (known as Chrome Variations) are both Google-managed distribution mechanisms, not terribly different from fetching the key at a Google API endpoint. 2) Having the relay serve the keys: these keys are actually designed to protect data from the relay. If the relay could change the public key Chrome uses to something the relay knows the private key for it would undermine the purpose of HPKE encryption. You suggested the relay could serve a key signed by Google. The issue with that is it complicates the process of key revocation. We expect to rotate the key we use, and we want to maintain the ability to revoke keys if needed (say the relay learned of a private key). Sure we could serve a signing key revocation list, but then we’re back in into the world of complicating the multi-party relationships. All this being said, addressing key consistency issue is on our radar, and we hope to improve the distribution model in the future. We welcome feedback of course; and we’ll take it into consideration as we continue to evolve the designs used here. There is a general blog post on Privacy Sandbox feedback at [1] and you can take a look at specifically how Chrome is fetching keys in [2]. In case you're curious the key we’re serving today has a cipher suite of (DHKEM_X25519_HKDF_SHA256, HKDF_SHA256, AES_256_GCM) and at the moment we have two gateways (one for read traffic and one for write traffic) each using their own single keypair. [1]: https://developer.chrome.com/docs/privacy-sandbox/feedback/ [2]: https://source.chromium.org/chromium/chromium/src/+/main:chr....
In Partnering with Fastly–Oblivious HTTP relay for FLEDGE's 𝑘-anonymity server
According to this: https://github.com/WICG/turtledove/blob/main/FLEDGE_k_anonym... You'll need to spend a Private State Token to call the k-anon API, minting PSTs is rate limited on the server side, and the client and server still cooperate to make forging PST requests hard (e.g. device integrity attestation, requiring the user be signed into Chrome). What I think this means is that you could undermine the k-anonymity in individual cases by large amounts of manual work, but not do so at scale.
In Partnering with Fastly–Oblivious HTTP relay for FLEDGE's 𝑘-anonymity server
> the idea that we have a choice between no ads or the most pernicious ads imaginable is certainly a false one I agree with you. I spent a large part of 2018-2019 trying to make ads declarative, and am now working on (among other things) increasing the isolation of conventional ads [1] and implementing cross-site advertising without cross-site identity leakage [2]. But it sounds like you and my parent have very different views: there's a lot of space between "ads should be a lot better" and "ads should not exist". [1] https://github.com/WICG/webpackage/issues/624 [2] https://github.com/WICG/turtledove/blob/main/FLEDGE.md
In An iframe from googlesyndication.com tries to access the camera and microphone
I am really puzzled by the negative sentiment around adtech on Hacker News, especially since I would guess that a lot of people here have a salary that depends directly or indirectly on advertising. "Tracking" gets a lot of bad press, so much so that I sometimes wonder if this is not organized by the tech giants (Apple, Google, Facebook) who have access to their own first party and who thus have much less to lose when cross site tracking disappears. Adtech providers only have access to products you buy/see, for a limited time and without any personal data, meanwhile Google and Facebook know everything about you, your friends, your center of interests the places you go to, along with your name but somehow everyone seems hell-bent on abolishing 3rd-party cookies. Apple's own apps are not subject to this change, and as noted by other comment
Read the rest
ers this will probably shift budgets to subscription of which Apple takes its cut. All this will further the supremacy of walled-gardens and big tech, at the expense of smaller independent players. I'll be honest, there is a creepy feeling when being tracked cross-site, and adtech providers have collectively failed at providing explanations, and a transparent account of how this works and why this is useful. They have also relied on fingerprinting, which has hurt the credibility of the field. The issue is that the replacement that are currently in the works (https://github.com/WICG/floc and https://github.com/WICG/turtledove/blob/main/FLEDGE.md) are extremely complex, will still dramatically impact adtech performance and only improve privacy for a very contrived definition of the concept which incidentally benefits once again big tech vendors... As to the effectiveness of advertising, removing tracking will have a huge impact. And this affects all players in the value chain, not only adtech providers but also publishers and more importantly advertisers which will see their return on ad spent severely impacted. There is a real of loss "social welfare" (I mean in a game-theoretic sense, but also for real if you believe in capitalism) if tracking is disabled. The freakonomics article gets cited a lot but the industry as a whole is moving forward with a greater emphasis on proving incremental sales. Advanced clients (who can spend billions per year) have real statisticians doing permanent randomized control trials proving that every dollar spent is providing incremental sales. I work for an adtech company and we have automatic RCTs for every single client, and guess what, advertising works for most clients. This is on top of fact that we are measuring the effectiveness of dollars spent on us, in addition to the dollars spent on competitors/other channels on which we have no control of course. The fact that Uber could see no impact when going from 150m to 50m is a testament to the incompetency of their CMO, which could not be bothered to actually measure and pilot the campaigns correctly, not the effectiveness of adtech as a whole. Thoughts are my own not my employer's.
In iOS 14 tracking changes sees big ad spending drop, tumbling prices
I think advertising is positive [1] and the role of ads in funding freely-available sites is very important. My current work is primarily on how browsers can allow more private and secure advertising [2][3][4] which I think most people will agree is valuable even if they are less in favor of advertising in general. At a lower level, I do this job because I'm paid, which allows me to donate. [5] But I wouldn't do this work if I thought it was harmful; there are lots of different kinds of jobs I could take. [1] https://www.jefftk.com/p/effect-of-advertising [2] https://github.com/google/fledge-shim [3] https://github.com/WICG/turtledove/issues/161 [4] https://github.com/WICG/webpackage/issues/624 [5] https://www.jefftk.com/donations
In GitHub blocks FLoC across all of GitHub Pages

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