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WICG
turtledove
Bikeshed2020–2023
WICG / turtledove · Archived

turtledove

TURTLEDOVE

18Distinct people
39Mentions
0Explicit recommenders
588GitHub stars
REPOSITORY AT A GLANCE

What to know before exploring

What it is

TURTLEDOVE

GitHub

Where it is used

No documented product use was verified in the last source check.

What people are saying

No recommendation phrase was found in the indexed comments.

No classified warning is attached to this page. Read the discussions before treating silence as approval.

Also in these discussions

Mentioned in the same Hacker News threads. That is not proof they are substitutes.

This week on Hacker News

Nov 9–Nov 16 UTC · Direct repository links and separately labeled related project stories. Indexed through 11/16/2026, 2:19:09 PM UTC.

No direct repository links were found in the indexed HN discussions over the past seven days. Older discussions are available below.

Mentions over time

HN mentions by year39 dated mentions

Observed mentions: 2020-03-25 01:04:40 UTC to 2023-10-30 21:42:16 UTC.

05101520252020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 8 mentions; 2 submissions, 6 comments20202021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 25 mentions; 0 submissions, 25 comments20212022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 6 mentions; 1 submissions, 5 comments2023

Counts come from the repository’s dated source evidence. Index cutoff: 2026-11-02 08:16:59 UTC.

View mention counts and date ranges
UTC ranges include their start and exclude their end. Select a period to filter the source evidence.
PeriodStart (UTC)End (exclusive, UTC)MentionsSubmissionsComments
20202020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC826
20212021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC25025
20222022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC000
20232023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC615

What Hacker News says

6 sources
It'll be interesting to see how this goes. Google and Mozilla+Meta each have competing standards. https://github.com/WICG/turtledove https://blog.mozilla.org/en/mozilla/privacy-preserving-attri... To my knowledge, Mozilla's design is the only one where someone other than the browser collects & reports on click activity, and with a fairly trustless anonymizing double blind strategy for those intermediaries.
In iOS 17 automatically removes tracking parameters from links you click on
That's the general idea. We're trying to limit the amount of abuse a single Google Account, device, or other first-party identity can cause. We have some more ideas and details we hope to share over time, but the goal is to keep writes to the API anonymous while preventing, the best we can, sybil attacks. We're willing to ignore/sacrifice some writes to achieve this (since any writes above ~k recent ones don't contribute directly to the utility of the system). Beyond Private State Tokens we also have new cryptography we're researching that should let us improve unlinkability between issuance and redemption further. https://github.com/WICG/turtledove/blob/main/FLEDGE_k_anonym... https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/320
In Partnering with Fastly–Oblivious HTTP relay for FLEDGE's 𝑘-anonymity server
You bring up an excellent point, and it’s something we really should discuss in our explainer: https://github.com/WICG/turtledove/blob/main/FLEDGE_k_anonym... We’ve been calling this problem key consistency, basically the risk that Google (or any OHTTP gateway operator) gives out unique keys to different users and builds a {user -> request} mapping based on the keys used to encrypt requests. The OHTTP authors published a draft spec discussing exactly this problem. https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-privacypass-key-... Frankly, none of the technical solutions we considered were satisfying enough given the added complexity. It’s actually kind of tricky to form a convincing distribution model. The designs we looked at mostly involve multi-party schemes where there’s trust required either that parties don’t collude with each other
Read the rest
or between the user and one party explicitly. Admittedly OHTTP is also premised on multiple parties not colluding, but we decided to punt on the key consistency problem for the sake of simplicity. We also recognize that it’s possible for savvy users to fetch the keys from the endpoints we’re serving them on, compare those keys with other users, and fact check our claims. We honestly have nothing to hide about this; everyone is receiving the same key. To specifically address the two proposals you made: 1) Shipping the key with the client: it’s not clear this is any better than fetching it right from Google. Chrome updates and our experiment framework (known as Chrome Variations) are both Google-managed distribution mechanisms, not terribly different from fetching the key at a Google API endpoint. 2) Having the relay serve the keys: these keys are actually designed to protect data from the relay. If the relay could change the public key Chrome uses to something the relay knows the private key for it would undermine the purpose of HPKE encryption. You suggested the relay could serve a key signed by Google. The issue with that is it complicates the process of key revocation. We expect to rotate the key we use, and we want to maintain the ability to revoke keys if needed (say the relay learned of a private key). Sure we could serve a signing key revocation list, but then we’re back in into the world of complicating the multi-party relationships. All this being said, addressing key consistency issue is on our radar, and we hope to improve the distribution model in the future. We welcome feedback of course; and we’ll take it into consideration as we continue to evolve the designs used here. There is a general blog post on Privacy Sandbox feedback at [1] and you can take a look at specifically how Chrome is fetching keys in [2]. In case you're curious the key we’re serving today has a cipher suite of (DHKEM_X25519_HKDF_SHA256, HKDF_SHA256, AES_256_GCM) and at the moment we have two gateways (one for read traffic and one for write traffic) each using their own single keypair. [1]: https://developer.chrome.com/docs/privacy-sandbox/feedback/ [2]: https://source.chromium.org/chromium/chromium/src/+/main:chr....
In Partnering with Fastly–Oblivious HTTP relay for FLEDGE's 𝑘-anonymity server
According to this: https://github.com/WICG/turtledove/blob/main/FLEDGE_k_anonym... You'll need to spend a Private State Token to call the k-anon API, minting PSTs is rate limited on the server side, and the client and server still cooperate to make forging PST requests hard (e.g. device integrity attestation, requiring the user be signed into Chrome). What I think this means is that you could undermine the k-anonymity in individual cases by large amounts of manual work, but not do so at scale.
In Partnering with Fastly–Oblivious HTTP relay for FLEDGE's 𝑘-anonymity server

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