webpackage

customer acquisition. [1] https://www.ampproject.org/ [2] https://contributor.google.com/ [3] https://fundingchoices.google.com [4] https://github.com/WICG/webpackage

n't required by default, for backwards-compatibility reasons, but they _do_ exist. > That way users can see what each page is doing just be looking at the requested permissions even before any popup appears Can you clarify what you mean by this? Most of the permissions you described are very low-level; not the sort of thing most users would want to concern themselves with (and certainly not for every site they visit). > Further to that, you can define in the browser which permissions to allow by default - this is a little like what is available already but more granular (eg the self-modifying page example earlier). Again, most of this seems like the sort of thing users wouldn't want to concern themselves with. What benefit would result from users being able to prevent a page from modifying its own DOM, for example? For permissions that actually impact the user's security or privacy (e.g. Camera, Mic, Clipboard, Cookies, Third-Party Cookies) this already exists. (See chrome://settings/content) Could you give some more examples of permissions you believe would be valuable to include here? Preferably stuff that has a clear, concrete impact on the user's security or privacy. > Further to that, some interactions (the exploitable ones) will be logged. eg calls from one domain to another. So some of the more experienced users have the ability to scan for suspicious behaviour without having to trawl through thousands of HTTP get / post requests. Is this really such a common use case that you think this needs to be built-into the browser rather than handled via an extension or Dev Tools? I'd also like to point out that in the case of cross-domain calls, a site which wants to hide their behavior could simply proxy calls to third-party sites through their own server. > I'd also like reminder prompts. eg if a service you allowed to make location requests does it frequently, I'd want a banner across the bottom of the page reminding users that this is happening frequently and that can only be mitigated by "trusting" that service with that API (an additional manual action on top of allowing it initial access to a particular browser feature). Already exists. Browsers show an icon in the address bar and on the tab when a page is accessing sensitive information like your mic, camera, or location. Mobile browsers display a persistent notification. > Another cool feature would be if versioning was built into webpages. Each page would be versioned and that version number would stored with a checksum of the page. Thus if the page changes between refreshes, the browser knows and resets all the permissions on that page to the user defaults (ie any previous prompts would then have to be re-prompted again). So every time a site make some minor update to their code, I'd have to re-authorize all permissions on that site? Seems rather inconvenient to me, and might lead to warning blindness (which would decrease overall security). That said, the upcoming [Web Packaging Standard][3] might do the "versioning" part of this at least. > It would also be nice to have some definable CPU and memory caps too - since each tab is basically now a virtual machine. I'm not sure this is something the user really wants to micromanage. If a tab I'm using needs to use 100% of my CPU to do its job, I don't think I'd want it to bother me with a prompt; I'd much rather just see an indicator or something indicating high resource usage so I can intervene if necessary. With the recent rise of JS-based cryptocoin miners; something like this may end up getting implemented in the near future. > Thus all I ask is you respect the spirit of what I'm saying rather than taking the points literally as a written gospel I'm suggesting we implement tomorrow. There will be problems implementing that verbatim but my point is to illustrate just how little protection the web offers and how much further we need to go given its current nature is basically just allowing anyone to run any untrusted application on their local machine. Thanks for the reminder. I've gone back over all my points in this post and tried to re-imagine your suggestions in the most constructive way possible. Sorry if I still seem skeptical. You have some good ideas, but keep in mind that these problems have already been considered in detail by numerous standards committees and browser vendors, so it's no surprise that a lot of the things you've suggested either already exist, or have good reasons for not existing. [1]: https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/CSP [2]: https://github.com/WICG/feature-policy [3]: https://github.com/WICG/webpackage

lly giving away the content for free. With time, this greatly contributed to the waning appetite of commercial publishers for RSS, despite it remaining popular in circles were the content was meant to be spread wide at no cost. Although many news organizations still offer RSS feeds, they're not really marketed prominently, and remain a loss leader to make savvy readers happy. Since alternate business models never achieved the same uptake, efforts like Google's AMP (and its offshoots like webpackage [1]) are a practical take on the syndication concept again, where the usage of adtech is assumed from the start, and the surfacer of the content becomes decoupled from its author. [1] https://github.com/WICG/webpackage

https://github.com/WICG/webpackage